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The Hughes Court Docket




For many years, the docket books kept by a number of the justices
of the Hughes Court have been held by the Office of the Curator of
the Supreme Court. Yet the existence of these docket books was
not widely known, and access to them was highly restricted.
Recently, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to
increase access to the docket books for researchers. This article
offers the first-ever examination of the available docket book
entries relevant to what scholars commonly regard as the major
decisions of rendered during the late years of the Hughes Court,
from the 1937 through the 1940 Terms. The decisions examined
concern the Commerce Clause, the dormant Commerce Clause,
substantive due process, equal protection, the general law, anti-
trust, labor relations, intergovernmental tax immunities, criminal
procedure, civil rights, and civil liberties. The information in the
docket books sheds new light on decisions such as Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell
Bros., Inc., Lane v. Wilson, Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman,
and United States v. Darby Lumber Co., and helps to explain how a
nine-justice Court divided evenly on one of the issues in Coleman v.
Miller. The docket books often reveal the justices' remarks at their
conference deliberations over major cases, and illuminate many
previously unknown changes in justices' positions between the
conference votes and their final votes on the merits. Analysis of the
voting data contained in the docket books also offers a contribution
to two bodies of political science scholarship on judicial behavior:
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the literature on vote fluidity and unanimity norms in the Supreme
Court, and the literature on the so-called "freshman effect" that
some scholars have found exhibited by the Court's newest mem-
bers. In particular, the analysis documents the prominent contribu-
tion that new justices, who disdained the Court's longstanding
norm of acquiescence in the judgments of conference majorities,
made to the substantial increase in the percentage of its cases that
the Court decided by a divided vote. The analysis further reveals
the significant part played by the last remnants of the Old Court in
retarding what would become a precipitous decline in unanimity
rates under Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.
For many years, the docket books kept by a number of the Hughes
Court justices have been held by the Office of the Curator of the
Supreme Court. Yet the existence of these docket books was not
widely known, and access to them was highly restricted. In April of
2014, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to in-
crease access to the docket books for researchers. This article pro-
vides the first report on and analysis of the contents of all the
docket books that the Curator's Office holds for the late Hughes
Court, comprising the 1937-1940 Terms. Only one of the entries in
these docket books has been examined and reported on before.'
This article canvasses the available docket book entries rele-
vant to what scholars commonly regard as the major decisions
of the late Hughes Court. 2 This review includes seventy-six
1 Professor Daniel Ernst has reported on Justice Butler's entry for Morgan v.
United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938). See Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville's Nightmare: The
Administrative State Emerges in America, 1900-1940, 186 n.115 (Oxford, New York,
2014) (citing Butler OT 1937 Docket Book). The existence of docket books of Justices
Pierce Butler and Harlan Fiske Stone for several of the Terms of Chief Justice William
Howard Taft's tenure was brought to the attention of the scholarly community by
Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1267 (2001).
2 The cases selected as "major" or "salient" are those that regularly appear in
scholarly treatments of the early Hughes Court. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Chief
Justiceship of Charles Evans Hughes, 1930-1941 (Univ. of South Carolina, Columbia,
S.C., 2007); Michael E. Parrish, The Hughes Court: Justices, Rulings, Legacy (ABA-
CLIO, 2002); G. Edward White, The Constitution and the New Deal (Harvard, Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2000); Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure
of a Constitutional Revolution (Oxford, New York, 1998); William E. Leuchtenburg,
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cases3 concerning areas of law as diverse as the Commerce Clause,
the dormant Commerce Clause, substantive due process, equal
protection, the general law, antitrust, labor relations, intergovern-
mental tax immunities, criminal procedure, civil rights, and civil lib-
erties. The information in the docket books sheds particularly
fascinating new light on decisions such as Erie Railroad v. Tomp-
kins,4 South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.,
Inc.,5 Lane v. Wilson,6 Coleman v. Miller,' and United States v Darby
Lumber Co.8 In addition, for these and the many other cases exam-
ined, this article also reports on whether a unanimous decision was
also free from dissent at conference or became so only because
The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt
(Oxford, New York, 1995); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the
Law (Viking, New York, 1956); Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horse-
men, 83 Va. L. Rev. 559 (1997); Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other
Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1891 (1994). I have selected these cases not with an eye toward obtain-
ing a representative sample of the Court's output, but instead because of the inter-
est that previous scholars have shown in them. Scholars may differ concerning the
inclusion or exclusion of particular cases from this category, and the statistical dis-
cussion in the Conclusion must be read with that caveat in mind. Notwithstanding
such potential differences, however, my effort has been to select cases about which
I believe there would be a broad measure of agreement. For other scholarship ex-
ploring judicial behaviour in "major" or "salient" cases, see Forrest Maltzman &
Peter J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger
Court, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 581, 589 (1996); Robert H. Dorff & Saul Brenner, Con-
formity Voting on the United States Supreme Court, 54 J. Politics 762, 772, 773
(1992); Timothy M. Hagle & Harold J. Spaeth, Voting Fluidity and the Attitudinal
Model of Supreme Court Decision Making, 44 Western Political Quarterly 119, 124
(1991); Saul Brenner, Timothy Hagle, & Harold J. Spaeth, Increasing the Size of Mini-
mum Winning Coalitions on the Warren Court, 23 Polity 309 (1990); Saul Brenner,
Timothy M. Hagle, & Harold J. Spaeth, The Defection of the Marginal Justice on the
Warren Court, 42 Western Political Quarterly 409 (1989); Saul Brenner, Fluidity on
the Supreme Court: 1956-1967, 26 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 388, 389 (1982); Saul Brenner,
Fluidity on the United States Supreme Court: A Reexamination, 24 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
526, 530 (1980); Ellliot E. Slotnick, Who Speaks for the Court? Majority Opinion
Assignment from Taft to Burger, 23 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 60 (1979).
3 This count includes five cases decided per curiam. I exclude from this count
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1939), discussed infra, n. 55, because
disparities in the conference records pose difficulties of classification.
4 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
6 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
7 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
8 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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one or more justices acquiesced in the judgment of their col-
leagues, as well as on whether non-unanimous decisions were di-
vided by the same vote and with the same alliances at conference.
The docket books also provide records of instances in which a case
that initially was assigned to one justice was later reassigned to an-
other. These records afford us some insight into the kinds of cases
in which this tended to occur.
A review of the docket books of the late Hughes Court also
makes possible two contributions to the political science literature
on judicial behavior. The first is to the scholarship on vote fluidity
and unanimity norms in the Supreme Court. It is widely agreed that
the period from the Chief Justiceship of John Marshall through that
of Charles Evans Hughes was characterized by a "norm of consen-
sus," "marked by individual justices accepting the Court's majority
opinions."9 It is generally believed that this norm of consensus col-
lapsed early in the Chief Justiceship of Harlan Fiske Stone,'0 though
some scholars have pointed to causes that antedate Stone's eleva-
tion to the center chair.1 Still others have suggested that there
9 Pamela C. Corley, Amy Steigerwalt, & Artemus Ward, Revisiting the Roosevelt
Court: The Critical Juncture from Consensus to Dissensus, 38 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 20, 22
(2013); Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, I Respectfully Dissent: Consensus,
Agendas, and Policymaking on the U.S. Supreme Court, 1888-1999, 21 Review of
Policy Research 429, 429 (2004); Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Harold J. Spaeth,
The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 362, 376
(2001); Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of Time and Consensual Norms
in the Supreme Court, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 874, 874-75 (1998); John P. Kelsh, The Opin-
ion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 Wash. U.
L. Q. 137, 161-62 (1999); Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein, & William J. Dixon, On the
Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J.
Politics 361, 361-62 (1988).
10 Herman C. Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Val-
ues, 1937-1947 40, 251 (Macmillan, New York, 1948) ("In 1941 divisive forces of
some kind hit the Court full force"); Corley, Steigerwalt, & Ward, 38 J. Sup. Ct. Hist.
at 47; Caldeira & Zorn, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. at 874-75; Walker, Epstein, & Dixon, 50 J.
Politics 362; David Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Proc-
ess, in Joel B. Grossman & Richard S. Wells, eds., Constitutional Law and Judicial Pol-
icy Making 175 (Wiley, New York, 1972).
11 Compare Stephen C. Halpern & Kenneth N. Vines, The Judges' Bill and the Role of
the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 Western Political Quarterly 471, 481 (1977) (arguing that
the enactment of the Judges' bill of 1925, which made the Court's docket almost en-
tirely discretionary, increased the proportion of cases that were legally or politically sa-
lient and thus less likely to elicit acquiescence from colleagues inclined to disagree
with the majority), with Walker, Epstein, & Dixon, 50 J. Politics at 365-66 (agreeing
364 Vol. 55
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may have been "an earlier, more gradual change in norms" on the
late Taft and Hughes Courts. 1 2 Political scientists who have had ac-
cess to the docket books of various justices serving on other Courts
have demonstrated that much of the consensus achieved by the
Court throughout its history has resulted from the decisions of jus-
tices who had dissented at conference to join the majority's ulti-
mate disposition. A substantial body of literature shows that
justices commonly have changed their votes between the confer-
ence and the final vote on the merits.1 3
that "it is possible that a discretionary docket may be one factor, and a necessary one
at that, in maintaining high levels of conflict once such patterns are established," but
disputing the contention that the 1925 statute was "the primary factor in the alter-
ation of the Court's consensus norms," pointing out that "significant escalation in
both the dissent and concurrence rates did not occur until almost fifteen years" after
the dramatic increase in the discretionary share of the Court's docket); accord, Cal-
deira & Zorn, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. at 875; Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as
Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft
Court, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1267, 1319-31 (2001) (rejecting the Halpern & Vines hypothe-
sis on the ground that unanimity rates in certiorari cases were higher than in those
falling under the Court's mandatory jurisdiction, and offering alternative reasons,
such as changes in external circumstances, in Court personnel, and in the quality of
Taft's leadership, for the decline in unanimity on the late Taft Court).
12 Caldeira & Zorn, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. at 892. See also Aaron J. Ley, Kathleen Searles,
& Cornell W. Clayton, The Mysterious Persistence of Non-Consensual Norms on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. 99, 106 (2013) ("the proportion of unanimous de-
cisions was declining prior to Stone's Chief Justiceship"); Marcus E. Hendershot, Mark
S. Hurwitz, Drew Noble Lanier, & Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., Dissensual Decision Making:
Revisiting the Demise of Consensual Norms within the U.S. Supreme Court, 20 Political
Research Quarterly 1, 8 (2012) ("the Court's norm of consensus was first challenged
by growing levels of dissent in the later years of the Hughes Court"); David M.
O'Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering the Rise
of Individual Opinions, in Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman, eds., Supreme Court
Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 103 (Univ. of Chicago, Chicago,
1999) ("the demise of the norm of consensus preceded Stone's chief justiceship");
Stacia L. Haynie, Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 54 J. Politics
1158 (1992) (arguing that Stone consolidated a shift in behavioral expectations that
began under Hughes). See also Kelsh, 77 Wash. U. L. Q. at 162 ("The most unusual
thing about the nonunanimity rate for the 1864-1940 period is that the last ten years
saw a sustained increase. This rate was to shoot up dramatically in the first years of
the Stone Court, but the beginnings of the rise can be seen around 1930"); id. at 173
("By the 1930s... Justices had fully accepted the view that separate opinions had a
legitimate role in the American legal system.") Compare Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law
and Literature 34 (1931) (characterizing dissenters as "irresponsible").
13 See, e.g., Epstein, Segal, & Spaeth, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 362 (Waite Court); Maltz-
man & Wahlbeck, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 581 (Burger Court); Dorff & Brenner, 54 J.
Politics 762 (Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts); Hagle & Spaeth, 44 Western
2015 365
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
Of the different types of vote fluidity between the conference
vote and the final vote on the merits in major late Hughes Court
cases, by far the most common was for a justice to move from a dis-
senting or passing vote to a vote with the ultimate majority. An ex-
amination of the docket books permits us to illuminate several
features of this phenomenon: the major cases in which it occurred;
how frequently it occurred in major cases; the frequency with
which each of the justices did so; and the comparative success of
early Hughes Court justices in preparing majority opinions that
would either enlarge the size of the ultimate winning coalition or
produce ultimate unanimity from a divided conference.
The second contribution concerns the behavior of newcomers to
the Court. In 1958, Eloise C. Snyder published an article in which
she concluded that new members of the Court tended initially to
affiliate with a moderate, "pivotal clique" before migrating to a
more clearly ideological liberal or conservative bloc.14 Seven years
later, J. Woodford Howard argued that Justice Frank Murphy's first
three terms on the Court were marked by a "freshman effect" char-
acterized by an "instability" in his decision making that rendered
the Justice "diffident to the point of indecisiveness."'5 These stud-
ies in turn spawned a literature on the "freshman" or "acclimation"
effect for justices new to the Court. These studies generally charac-
terize the freshman effect "as consisting of one or more of the fol-
lowing types of behavior: (1) initial bewilderment or disorientation,
(2) assignment of a lower than average number of opinions to the
new justices, and (3) an initial tendency on the part of the new jus-
tice to join a moderate block of justices."' 6 While some studies
Political Quarterly 119 (Warren Court); Brenner, Hagle, & Spaeth, 23 Polity 309
(Warren Court); Brenner, Hagle, & Spaeth, 42 Western Political Quarterly 409 (War-
ren Court); Brenner, 26 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 388 (Warren Court); Saul Brenner, Ideological
Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court: A Comparison of the Original Vote on the Merits
with the Final Vote, 22 Jurimetrics 287 (1982) (Vinson and Warren Courts); Brenner,
24 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 526 (Vinson and Warren Courts); J. Woodford Howard, Jr., On the
Fluidity of Judicial Choice, 62 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 43 (1968) (Stone and Vinson Courts).
14 Eloise C. Snyder. The Supreme Court as a Small Group, 3 Social Forces 232, 238
(1958).
1s Woodford Howard, Justice Murphy: The Freshman Years, 18 Vand. L. Rev. 473,
474,476,477,484, 488, 505 (1965).
16 Timothy M. Hagle, "Freshman Effects" for Supreme Court Justices, 37 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 1142, 1142 (1993). See also Leigh Anne Williams, Measuring Internal Influ-
ence on the Rehnquist Court: An Analysis of Non-Majority Opinion Joining Behavior
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have confirmed the existence of some feature or another of the
freshman effect,17 others have cast significant doubt on the hy-
pothesis, maintaining that it is either non-existent or confined to
limited circumstances.' 8 Studies of the freshman period for
68 Ohio St. L. J. 679, 718-19 (2007); Saul Brenner & Timothy M. Hagle, Opinion
Writing and Acclimation Effect, 18 Pol. Behav. 235 (1996); Paul C. Arledge & Edward
W. Heck, A Freshman Justice Confronts the Constitution: Justice O'Connor and the
First Amendment, 45 Western Pol. Q. 761, 761-62 (1992); Edward V. Heck &
Melinda Gann Hall, Bloc Voting and the Freshman Justice Revisited, 43 J. Politics
852, 853-54 (1981); Elliot E. Slotnick, Judicial Career Patterns and Majority Opinion
Assignment on the Supreme Court, 41 J. Politics 640, 641 (1979).
17 See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Kevin Quinn, Andrew D. Martin, & Jeffrey E. Segal, On
the Perils of Drawing Inferences about Supreme Court Justices from Their First Few
Years of Service, 91 Judicature 168, 179 (2008) (finding evidence of ideological insta-
bility in the merits voting of "virtually all" freshman justices); Mark S. Hurwitz & Jo-
seph V. Stefko, Acclimation and Attitudes: "Newcomer" Justices and Precedent
Conformance on the Supreme Court, 57 Pol. Res. Q. 121 (2004) (finding freshman ef-
fect with respect to conformity to precedent); Charles R. Shipan, Acclimation Effects
Revisited, 40 Jurimetrics 243 (2000) (finding evidence of ideological instability in the
merits voting of some but not most freshmen justices on the Warren and Burger
Courts); Sandra L. Wood, Linda Camp Keith, Drew Noble Lanier, & Ayo Ogundele,
"Acclimation Effects" for Supreme CourtJustices: A Cross-Validation, 1888-1940, 42
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 690, 694 (1998) (finding "some evidence of an acclimation effect for
at least some of the justices" with respect to ideological instability in merits voting);
Brenner & Hagle, 18 Pol. Behav. 235 (finding freshman effect with respect to opin-
ion output); Timothy M. Hagle, A New Test for the Freshman Effect, 21 Southeastern
Pol. Rev. 289 (1993) (finding evidence of ideological instability in the merits voting
of some freshman justices on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts); Hagle, 37 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 1142 (finding evidence of ideological instability in the merits voting of
some justices joining the Court between 1953 and 1989); S. Sidney Ulmer, Toward a
Theory of Sub-Group Formation in the United States Supreme Court, 27 J. Politics
133, 151 (1965) (finding some evidence of freshman effect in bloc voting for justices
joining the Court between 1946 and 1961).
I See, e.g., Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs II, & Forrest Maltzman, The Politics
of Dissents and Concurrences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 American Politics Quar-
terly 488, 503-04 (1999) ("Contrary to the freshman effect hypothesis, freshman
justices are no less likely to join or author a concurring or dissenting opinion than
their more senior colleagues"); Richard Pacelle & Patricia Pauly, The Freshman Effect
Revisited: An Individual Analysis, 17 Am. Rev. Politics. 1, 6, 15 (1996) (finding no
freshman effect with respect to ideological instability in merits votes in the aggre-
gate, and "only limited evidence" of such an effect with respect to individual jus-
tices joining the Court between 1945 and 1988); Terry Bowen, Consensual Norms
and the Freshman Effect on the United States Supreme Court, 76 Soc. Sci. Q. 222,
227 (1995) (finding no freshman effect for separate opinion writing on the Hughes
and Taft Courts, but finding such a freshman effect during the 1941-1992 period);
Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb II, Freshman Opinion Writing on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1921-1991, 76 Judicature 239 (1993) (finding no freshman effect with re-
spect to opinion assignments); Robert L. Dudley, The Freshman Effect and Voting
2015 367
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individual justices on the whole have not lent much support to the
hypothesis.' 9
Professor Howard suggested that the freshman effect might also
be manifested by a tendency of new justices to change their votes
between the conference vote and the final vote on the merits.
Howard listed a number of considerations that might prompt a jus-
tice to shift ground in this manner, but first among them were "un-
stable attitudes that seem to have resulted from the process of
assimilation to the Court." For instance, he remarked, "Justice Car-
dozo, according to one clerk's recollection of the docket
books... frequently vot[ed] alone in conference before ultimately
submerging himself in a group opinion." 20 Howard reported that
Alignments: A Reexamination of Judicial Folklore, 21 Am. Politics Q. 360 (1993)
(finding no freshman effect with respect to bloc voting even when using Snyder's
data); Terry Bowen & John M. Scheb II, Reassessing the "Freshman Effect": The Vot-
ing Bloc Alignment of New Justices on the United States Supreme Court, 1921-90,
15 Pol. Behav. 1 (1983) (finding no freshman effect with respect to bloc voting);
Heck & Hall, 43 J. Politics 852 (finding very little evidence of a freshman effect in
bloc voting on the Warren and Burger Courts); Slotnick, 41 J. Politics 640 (finding no
freshman effect with respect to opinion assignments). For efforts to explain the di-
vergences in scholarly findings, see Hagle, 21 Southeastern Pol. Rev. 289; Hagle, 37
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1142; Albert P. Melone, Revisiting the Freshman Effect Hypothesis:
The First Two Terms of Justice Anthony Kennedy, 74 Judicature 6, 13 (1990); Heck &
Hall, 43 J. Politics at 859-60.
19 See, e.g., Thomas R. Hensley, Joyce A. Baugh, & Christopher E. Smith, The First-
Term Performance of Chief Justice John Roberts, 43 Idaho L. Rev. 625, 631 (2007)
(finding no freshman effect with respect to bloc voting); Christopher E. Smith &
S. Thomas Read, The Performance and Effectiveness of New Appointees to the Rehn-
quist Court, 20 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 205 (1993) (finding a freshman effect with respect
to Justice Souter but not with respect to Justice Thomas); Arledge & Heck, 45 West-
ern Pol. Q. 761 (finding no freshman effect); Melone, 74 Judicature 6 (finding a
freshman effect only with respect to majority opinion assignments); Thea F. Rubin
& Albert P. Melone, Justice Antonin Scalia: A First Year Freshman Effect?, 72 Judica-
ture 98 (1988) (finding a freshman effect only with respect to majority opinion as-
signments); John M. Scheb II & Lee W. Ailshie, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the
Freshman Effect, 69 Judicature 9 (1985) (finding evidence of a freshman effect only
with respect to majority opinion assignments in her first Term); Edward V. Heck, The
Socialization of a Freshman Justice: The Early Years of Justice Brennan, 10 Pac. L. J.
707, 714-16, 722-25 (1979) (finding little evidence of a freshman effect).
20 Howard, Jr., 62 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 45. The clerk to whom Howard referred
was Paul Freund, who clerked for Justice Brandeis during the 1932 Term. See Paul
Freund, A Tale of Two Terms, 26 Ohio St. L. J. 225, 227 (1965) ("I was struck in the
1932 Term with the number of occasions on which what came down as unanimous
opinions had been far from that at conference. I had access to the docket book
which the Justice kept as a record of the conference vote - these books are
Vol. 55368
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Justice Murphy exhibited "a similar instability" during his freshman
years on the Court. 2 1 Subsequent studies from the Vinson, Warren,
and Burger Court docket books have produced divergent conclu-
sions with respect to this reputed feature of the freshman effect.2 2
Though there is no agreed-upon period of judicial tenure during
which to test for the freshman effect, the periods tested in the liter-
ature have ranged from one to five years. 23 Between 1937 and
1940 Franklin Roosevelt appointed five new justices to the
Supreme Court: Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter,
William 0. Douglas, and Frank Murphy. A review of the voting
behavior of these newcomers to the Court does not disclose any
appreciable freshman effect with respect to voting fluidity. Instead,
one finds that in the major cases examined here, these justices
were among the least likely to change their positions between the
conference vote and the final vote on the merits.
This article proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the justices
of the late Hughes Court and describes the contents of their
destroyed at the end of each term - and I was enormously impressed with how
many divisions there were that did not show up in the final vote. I was impressed
with how often Justice Cardozo was in a minority, often of one, at conference, but
did not press his position.")
21 Howard, Jr., 62 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 45.
22 Compare Maltzman & Wahlbeck, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 589 (finding that
"freshmen justices are significantly more likely to switch than are their more senior
colleagues"), Saul Brenner, Another Look at Freshman Indecisiveness on the United
States Supreme Court, 16 Polity 320 (1983) (finding that between the 1946 and
1966 Terms freshman justices exhibited on average greater fluidity between the
conference vote and the final votes on the merits than did senior justices, and that
this fluidity tended to diminish between a justice's first and fourth terms on the
Court), and Dorff & Brenner, 54 J. Politics at 767, 769-71 (finding that freshman jus-
tices were "more likely to be uncertain regarding how to vote at the original vote
on the merits and more likely to be influenced by the decision of the majority at the
final vote") with Hagle & Spaeth, 44 Western Political Quarterly 119 (finding that
the voting fluidity of freshman justices on the Warren Court did not differ signifi-
cantly from that of their more senior colleagues, and that the voting fluidity of such
freshman justices had not diminished by their third and fourth Terms on the Court).
See also Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II, & Peter J. Wahlbeck, Passing and
Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 Law & Society Rev. 349, 369 (2005)
(finding that freshman justices on the Burger Court did not pass more frequently
than their senior colleagues).
23 Brenner & Hagle, 18 Pol. Behav. at 239. Professor Howard, the first to identify
the phenomenon, suggested that the freshman period was typically about three
years. Howard, Jr., 62 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 45.
369
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surviving docket books. Section II discusses the major decisions
handed down by the late Hughes Court during the 1937-1940
terms. Section III examines the reassignment practices of the late
Hughes Court. Section IV concludes.
1. THE LATE HUGHES COURT JUSTICES AND THEIR
DOCKET BOOKS
In contrast to the early Hughes Court, the late Hughes Court was
notable for its significant and frequent changes in personnel. Jus-
tice Willis Van Devanter retired on June 2, 1937,24 and was replaced
by Justice Hugo Black on August 18 of that year. 2 5 Justice George
Sutherland stepped down on January 18, 1938,26 and Justice Stan-
ley Reed took seat on January 31.27 Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo be-
came ill in December of 1937, and did not sit for any cases
thereafter.28 He died on July 8, 1938,29 and was replaced by Justice
Felix Frankfurter on January 30, 1939.30 Justice Louis D. Brandeis re-
tired on February 13, 1939,31 and was succeeded by Justice William
0. Douglas two months later on April 17.32 Illness prevented Justice
Pierce Butler from attending any of the Court's sessions during the
1939 Term, and he did not take part in any of that Term's cases.33
He died on November 16 of that year,3 4 and Justice Frank Murphy
assumed his seat on February 5, 1940.3s And though Justice James
Clark McReynolds retired on February 1, 1941,36 Justice James
Byrnes did not replace him until July 8 of that year 37-just over a
24 302 U.S. iii.
25 302 U.S. iii.
26 303 U.S. iv.
27 303 U.S. iv.
28 302 U.S. iii; 303 U.S. iv; 304 U.S. iii.
29 305 U.S. iii.
30 306 U.S. iii.
31 306 U.S. iii.
32 306 U.S. iii.
33308 U.S. iii.
34308 U.S. iii.
3s 309 U.S. iii.
36 312 U.S. iii.
37 314 U.S. iv.
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week after Hughes's retirement on July 1.38 Of the justices who sat
with Hughes during the tumultuous 1936 Term, only Harlan Fiske
Stone and Owen Roberts remained on the Court for the remainder
of Hughes's tenure as Chief Justice.
The Office of the Curator has in its collection the docket books of
six of the late Hughes Court justices. Unfortunately, the docket
books of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Sutherland do not appear
to have survived, and during this period Justice McReynolds burned
his docket books at the conclusion of each Term. 3 9 However, the
Curator's collection does contain a nearly complete run of Pierce
Butler's docket books, including the 1937 through 1939 Terms. But-
ler's docket book for the 1939 Term regrettably is not of much use,
as the Justice became ill and died rather early in the Term, and did
not participate in any of the Term's cases.40 This gap is especially
unfortunate, because Butler's docket books provide not only a re-
cord of conference votes, but also a remarkably rich set of notes on
conference discussions. These notes corroborate numerous ac-
counts of Hughes's conduct of the Court's conferences,41 at which
the Chief Justice would begin with a masterful presentation of the
facts and issues in each case and a statement of his own views of
how those issues should be resolved. The justices would next pre-
sent their own views in descending order of seniority, and would fi-
nally cast their votes in ascending order of seniority, with Hughes
voting last. Butler's notes therefore often consist principally of the
Chief Justice's remarks, which help to compensate for the fact that
Hughes's docket books and Court papers have not survived.
The Curator's collection likewise contains a complete run of the
docket books of Justice Stone, from the 1937 through the 1940
Terms. The Stone docket books contain records of the conference
votes in most cases, and occasionally some notes on the remarks
made by colleagues during conference discussions. Unfortunately,
Stone's handwriting is very difficult to decipher, so the content of
these notes too often remains obscure. The collection also has
38 313 U.S. iii.
39 Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow, eds., The Forgotten Memoir of John
Knox 84 (Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, 2002).
40 308 U.S. iii.
41 See, e.g., the discussion and sources collected in Ross at 219-21.
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nearly a complete run of the docket books for Owen Roberts, in-
cluding the 1937, 1938, and 1940 Terms. Unfortunately, the collec-
tion does not contain a docket book for Roberts for the 1939 Term.
It does not appear that this docket book has survived. The Roberts
docket books similarly contain records of the conference votes in
most cases, along with an occasional but none-too-frequent note
on conference discussions.
Professor Paul Freund, who clerked for Justice Brandeis during
the 1932 Term, reported that for most of his judicial career the Jus-
tice destroyed his docket books at the end of each Term. 42 Brandeis
discontinued this practice toward the end of his tenure, however,
and as a result the Curator's collection holds his docket books for
the 1937 and 1938 Terms. These books contain records of the con-
ference votes in most cases, along with occasional notes on confer-
ence discussions. Brandeis's handwriting is more legible than
Stone's, but still sometimes difficult to make out. Regrettably, in
some instances the Justice's notes on the conference discussion are
obscured by a pasted-over, typed account of the ultimate disposi-
tion. Unlike his colleagues, Brandeis systematically recorded the
dates on which cases were taken up in conference. The entries in
the docket book for the 1938 Term are incomplete because of the
Justice's retirement in February of 1939.43
The collection's holdings of docket books for the newer justices
of the late Hughes Court are comparatively small. There is a 1939
Term docket book for Frankfurter, but it contains no entries. There
are also Murphy docket books for the 1939 and 1940 Terms, but
the 1939 docket book contains no records of conference votes or
deliberations for cases decided that Term. This leaves Stone's as the
only informative 1939 docket book in the Curator's collection. For-
tunately, Stone's entries can be corroborated and clarified by Jus-
tice Douglas's docket books for the 1938 through 1940 Terms,
which are among those housed with his other papers in the Manu-
script Division of the Library of Congress. In addition, Justice Reed's
docket books for the 1937 through 1940 Terms are among those
held with his papers at the M. I. King Library at the University of
42 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Professor Paul A. Freund, "A Colloquy,"
Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit (May 24, 1989), reprinted in 124 F.R.D. 241, 347 (1988).
43 306 U.S. iii.
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Kentucky. Reed's docket books also provide a useful check on those
of his colleagues, though unfortunately there were several cases
decided during the 1939 and 1940 Terms for which Reed did not re-
cord the conference vote.4 4
In discussing the post-conference voting behaviors of the Hughes
Court justices, I will be using several defined terms. I shall use the
term acquiescence to denote instances in which a justice who ei-
ther dissented or passed at conference ultimately joined in the ma-
jority's disposition.4 5 In other words, acquiescence denotes
instances in which a justice who was not with the majority at con-
ference moved toward the majority. I will refer to movements from
dissent at conference to the majority in the final vote on the
merits 4 6 as instances of strong acquiescence; movements from a
passing vote at conference to the majority in the final vote on the
merits as instances of weak acquiescence.4 7 Of course, such move-
ment might have occurred either because the justice in question
became persuaded that the majority was correct, or because,
though remaining unpersuaded, he elected to go along with the
majority for the sake of some other consideration such as collegial-
ity or public perception.48 The information contained in the docket
books does not enable us to discriminate between these two
44 Each of these docket books in the Curator's collection remained in the
Supreme Court building after the respective justice either retired or died while in of-
fice. It is not known why these volumes were retained, nor why not all of the sets
of docket books are complete. In 1972 all of the "historic" docket books held in the
Supreme Court building were boxed up by the Court's Marshal at the order of Chief
Justice Warren Burger, and were later transferred to the Curator's Office. Email
communication from Matthew Hofstedt, Associate Curator, Supreme Court of the
United States, August 26, 2014.
45 This is also sometimes referred to as "conformity voting," see, e.g., Dorff &
Brenner, 54 J. Politics at 763; or "minority-majority voting," see, e.g., Saul Brenner
& Robert H. Dorff, The Attitudinal Model and Fluidity Voting on the United States
Supreme Court: A Theoretical Perspective, 4 J. Theoretical Politics 195, 197 (1992).
46 I borrow this term from Brenner, 22 Jurimetrics at 287. What Professor Brenner
calls the "original vote on the merits" I refer to as the "conference vote."
47 These two terms are adapted from Saul Brenner, Fluidity on the Supreme
Court: 1956-1967, 26 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 388, 388 (1982) and Saul Brenner, Fluidity on
the United States Supreme Court: A Reexamination, 24 J. Pol. Sci. 526, 527 (1980)
(referring to such movements as "strong fluidity" and "weak fluidity," respectively.)
48 See, e.g., Brenner & Dorif, 4 J. Theoretical Politics at 200 (concluding that jus-
tices acquiesce "for non-attitudinal reasons, including small-group reasons"); How-
ard, Jr., 62 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 45 (same).
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possibilities, and therefore I shall not attempt to do so here. I will
use the term non-acquiescence to denote instances in which a jus-
tice who dissented at conference remained steadfast in his opposi-
tion to the majority's disposition. In cases of non-acquiescence,
there was no post-conference change in the vote of the justice in
question. Finally, I will use the term defection to denote instances
in which a justice who was either member of the conference major-
ity or passed at conference later dissented from the pub-
lished opinion. 4 9 In other words, defection denotes instances in
which the justice in question resisted what Dean Robert Post has
called the "norm of acquiescence"50 by moving away from the
majority. Again, I will refer to movements from the majority at con-
ference to dissent in the final vote on the merits as instances of
strong defection; movements from a passing vote at conference to
the dissent in the final vote on the merits as instances of weak
defection.51
2. THE CASES
Unanimous Decisions with No Vote Changes
Though most of the major unanimous decisions of the late
Hughes Court involved post-conference acquiescence, there were
some that produced unanimity from the outset. It is noteworthy
that many though not all of these cases were decided after McRey-
nolds, the last of the Four Horsemen to leave the bench, retired
from the Court in early 1941. Such was the case in the leading fed-
eral courts decision of Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,
Inc., 5 2 which held that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdic-
tion must apply the conflict of laws principles of the state in which
49 This is also sometimes referred to as "counterconformity voting," see, e.g.,
Dorff & Brenner, 54 J. Politics at 763; or "majority-minority voting," see, e.g., Bren-
ner & Dorff, 4 J. Theoretical Politics at 197.
sO Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1309.
51 Id. There also are instances in which a docket book entry does not record a
vote for a particular justice. Often that was because the justice was absent from the
conference, and where that was the case, I do not treat that justice as having en-
gaged in any of the defined voting behaviors.
52 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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it sits. 53 In the still-divisive domain of political economy, the leading
such example is Olsen v. Nebraska, which upheld state regulation
of fees charged by employment agencies.54 Before his departure,
however, McReynolds did agree from the outset with a few unani-
mous political economy decisions. Among these were judgments
upholding National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rulings ordering
companies to cease commission of unfair labor practices,ss and
Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp.,56 which unanimously invali-
dated a Maryland state tax on mortgages as applied to a mortgage
tendered for record by the federal Home Owners' Loan
53 Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1940
Docket Book; Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book. Reed OT 1940 Docket Book contains
no record of the conference vote.
54 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket
Book; Douglas OT 1940 Docket Book; Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book. Reed OT 1940
Docket Book contains no record of the conference vote.
ss See, e.g., NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272 (1938), and NLRB
v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938) (supporting NLRB rulings
ordering interstate transit companies to cease commission of unfair labor practices)
(Reed and Cardozo took no part); Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937
Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937 Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book. In
each case Stone wrote "out" in Reed's voting column and a question mark next to
Butler's vote with the majority. Butler's entry has no record of the vote in Pacific
Greyhound, writing only "Little difference from 413 (Pennsylvania Greyhound]." In
Pennsylvania Greyhound, Butler noted that he voted with the majority "tenta-
tively." Reed OT 1937 Docket Book simply records for each case, "No participation."
It appears that McReynolds harbored unexpressed reservations in each of these
cases. On his return of Stone's opinion in Pennsylvania Greyhound he wrote, "I can-
not agree but don't care to pursue the matter further." Justice McReynolds, Return
of NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., Box 63, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. On his return in Pacific Greyhound,
McReynolds simply wrote, "As in No. 413 [Pennsylvania Greyhound]." Justice
McReynolds, Return of NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., Box 63, Harlan Fiske
Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
Also possibly in this category is National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1939)
(affirming NLRB ruling ordering company to cease unfair labor practices, with Black
and Douglas voting to affirm but without modification of the order) (Murphy took
no part). Stone OT 1939 Docket Book records the conference vote as unanimous,
but Douglas OT 1939 Docket Book records McReynolds as passing. Reed OT 1939
Docket Book records Roberts and Murphy as passing, and all others voting to affirm.
It appears likely that Douglas correctly recorded McReynolds's position. On his re-
turn of Stone's opinion McReynolds wrote, "I do not care to say anything." Justice
McReynolds, Return of National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, Box 65, Harlan Fiske Stone
MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
56 308 U.S. 21 (1939).
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Corporation.57 And in United States v. Powers,58 the Court unani-
mously sustained indictments under the Connally Hot Oil Act,
which prohibited interstate shipment of oil "produced or with-
drawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted... by any
State law." 59
A mixed bag of civil rights and civil liberties decisions also were
unanimous at both the conference vote and the final vote on the mer-
its. Breedlove v. Suttless upheld Georgia's requirement that voters
pay a poll tax. 6 1 By contrast, Hale v. Kentucky6 2 was a unanimous per
curiam decision reversing a murder conviction on the ground that Afri-
can-Americans had been systematically excluded from the grand
jury.63 Mitchell v. United States" unanimously held that the consign-
ment of an African-American passenger (who happened to be a mem-
ber of the U.S. House of Representatives) to a segregated second-class
rail car when he offered to pay for available first-class accommoda-
tions violated the Interstate Commerce Act. 65 Cox v. New Hampshire 66
unanimously affirmed convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for violation
of a state statute prohibiting a "parade or procession" upon a public
street without a special license.67 Finally, United States v. Miller68
s7 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939 Docket Book. Reed OT 1939
Docket Book contains no record of the conference vote.
58 307 U.S. 214 (1939).
5 Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book does not record a vote for Butler, but the Stone
OT 1938 Docket Book, the Butler OT 1938 Docket Book, and the Douglas OT 1938
Docket Book each record the April 22 vote as unanimous and Butler as in the major-
ity. Reed OT 1938 Docket Book simply records, "All reverse."
so 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
61 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937 Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937
Docket Book. Butler recorded in his Docket Book, "19 Am. not involved."
62 303 U.S. 613 (1938).
63 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book; Reed OT 1937 Docket Book. Both
Brandeis and Cardozo were absent from the conference, and Cardozo took no part
in the decision.
64 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
65 Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; Reed OT 1940
Docket Book; Douglas OT 1940 Docket Book; Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book.
66 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
67 Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; Reed OT 1940
Docket Book; Douglas OT 1940 Docket Book; Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book.
68 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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unanimously upheld provisions of the National Firearms Act over
Tenth and Second Amendment objections. The vote at the confer-
ence was unanimous, with the ailing Chief Justice not present.6 9
Unanimous Decisions with Vote Changes
There were several important decisions in which the late Hughes
Court forged unanimity in the wake of a divided conference vote.
Many of these involved significant questions of constitutional polit-
ical economy. In two cases handed down in early 1938, for exam-
ple, the Court unanimously held that power companies lacked
standing to challenge grants and loans made by the Emergency
Relief Administration of Public Works to assist in the construction
of electrical distribution systems. In the conference votes in Ala-
bama Power Co. v. Ickes7o and Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood
County,7 however, McReynolds had passed.7 2 Stone records Black,
who ultimately concurred in the result in both cases, as arguing
that there was "No standing" in Alabama Power?3 Butler records
Hughes asserting that there was "no coercion" involved in the
building of the systems, though the "competition will have serious
effect." Brandeis agreed with Hughes, and Sutherland stated that
the company "Has no standing to complain." McReynolds
69 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938
Docket Book; Reed OT 1938 Docket Book. Douglas took no part in the decision.
Miller was argued on March 30 and decided on May 15. 307 U.S. 174. Hughes was
absent from the Court due to illness from March 4 to April 15, and therefore was
not present for the April 1 Miller conference. See Hughes Attends Court Conference,
Wash. Post, April 16, 1939, p. 3 ("Chief Justice Hughes attended a conference of the
Supreme Court justices yesterday. It was his first visit to the Court since he became
ill with grippe March 4.") In Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939), the Court unani-
mously upheld an animal disposal licensing statute against a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge. The conference vote was similarly unanimous, though the ailing
and hence absent Hughes did not vote. Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938
Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book; Reed OT 1938 Docket Book. Brandeis
was absent from the conference, and his docket book contains no record of the con-
ference vote. Brandeis OT 1938 Docket Book. Butler's record contains the notation,
"Qualified concurrence. Health measure."
70 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
71302 U.S. 485 (1938).
72 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book.
73 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book.
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remarked "is a fraud from bot[tom] to top."74 One might infer from
these comments that McReynolds's ultimate vote with the majority
was an instance of acquiescence rather than conversion.
In South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros.,
Inc.,75 a major dormant Commerce Clause decision, the Court unan-
imously upheld a state highway safety statute prohibiting certain
truck transportation from entering the state. At the conference
vote, however, Brandeis cast a dissenting ballot.76 Butler records
Hughes as stating, "Uniformity not required by ICC [interstate Com-
merce Clause]. One state can't decide for another. Congress has
not taken over this field. But as there is a burden, this state can't go
beyond its necessities. But that is not a judicial question. State leg-
islative discretion." Butler records McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler,
and Stone as voicing agreement with Hughes, but Brandeis as argu-
ing "No. bad use of highway. ... Finding that caused interruption of
great inter[state] com[merce] not justified."77 On his return of
Stone's opinion, however, Brandeis wrote, "A job admirably done.
There is so much in the opinion that is wise and well said that, de-
spite some lingering doubts, I agree - and congratulate you." 78
United States v. Lowden 79 is interesting primarily for what reveals
about the status of the 1935 case of Railroad Retirement Board v.
Alton Railroad Co.,s0 in which Roberts had written an opinion
joined by the Four Horsemen striking down the Railroad Retire-
ment Act of 1934. Lowden unanimously upheld an Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) order permitting one railroad company to
lease its facilities to another railway company.81 Because the ICC
74 Butler OT 1937 Docket Book.
7s 303 U.S. 177 (1938). Cardozo and Reed took no part in the decision.
76 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937 Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937
Docket Book. Brandeis has an illegible notation next to Black's vote.
7 Butler OT 1937 Docket Book. Stone also records Hughes as saying, "Uniformity
not required. One state can't decide for another. State may not [four illegible
words], but that a matter for legislative not judicial judgment." Stone OT 1937
Docket Book.
78 Justice Brandeis, Return of South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barn-
well Bros., Inc., Box 63, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress.
7 308 U.S. 225 (1939). Butler took no part in the decision.
8 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
81 308 U.S. at 238.
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recognized that the lease would result in the discharge or transfer
of several employees of the lessor railroad, the order conditioned
the agency's approval of the lease agreement on the payment of
partial compensation to such employees for any losses they might
suffer as a consequence.8 2 The trustees in bankruptcy of the rail-
roads in question invoked Alton in support of the claim that the
order was not within the congressional power to regulate inter-
state commerce and worked a denial of due process. Stone's major-
ity opinion upholding the order dismissed these objections. 3
"[N]otwithstanding what was said" in Alton, Stone maintained, the
order was rationally related to the protection of the public interest
as defined by the statute, and that was reason enough to uphold
it.8 4 Stone later wrote privately to Robert Jackson that the Lowden
would "serve as both a footnote and a headstone" for Alton.85 Yet
the unanimity of the published opinion masked significant divisions
at conference. There the vote was 5-3, with the ailing Butler absent
and McReynolds and Roberts dissenting along with Hughes.86 On
his return of the opinion McReynolds wrote, "Sorry, this seems to
me both wrong and unfortunate."8 7 In the end, however, each of
the conference dissenters suppressed his disagreement with the
majority's judgment. As Roberts wrote on his return of Stone's
opinion, "I voted the other way, but am not disposed to say any-
thing; and unless someone else writes, I shall acquiesce."88
In the landmark Commerce Clause decision of United States v.
Darby,89 the Court unanimously upheld the Fair Labor Standards
82 Id. at 228.
83 Id. at 239.
84 Id. at 239-40.
5 Harlan Fiske Stone to Robert H. Jackson, Jan. 25, 1941, quoted in Alpheus
Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske stone at 556 n.38.
86 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Reed OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939
Docket Book. It is sometimes forgotten that Hughes, who wrote the dissenting opin-
ion in Alton, agreed that at least one of the provisions of the Railroad Retirement
Act of 1934 violated the Due Process Clause. See 295 U.S. at 389 (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting).
87 Justice McReynolds, Return of United States v. Lowden, Box 65, Harlan Fiske
Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
88 Justice Roberts, Return of United States v. Lowden, Box 65, Harlan Fiske Stone
MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
89 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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Act of 1938. At the conference, however, Hughes and McReynolds
passed.90 The notes of the conference discussion taken by Douglas
and Murphy reveal that Hughes was troubled by the question of
whether the provisions of the Act regulating the wages and hours of
workers engaged in "production for commerce" lay within the scope
of the commerce power.9 ' Hughes also was concerned that the stat-
ute provided notice insufficient to support criminal penalties, 92 and
it has been suggested that it was this concern rather than those over
the Commerce Clause issue that were largely responsible for his hes-
itation in conference.93 This contention finds some support in the
note that Hughes wrote on his return of Stone's draft opinion in a
civil companion case to Darby, Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.94 Opp
raised the same commerce power questions presented in Darby, but
Stone used the Darby opinion to dispose of them, and therefore con-
fined the Opp opinion to treatment of the issues peculiar to that liti-
gation.95 But because Opp was a civil proceeding rather than a
criminal prosecution, it did not present the notice issue that troubled
Hughes in Darby. Thus, on his return of Stone's Darby opinion
Hughes merely acquiesced, writing a grudging, "I will go along with
this." 96 On his return of Stone's Opp opinion, by contrast, Hughes
wrote, 'Very careful and satisfactory."9 7 From this one might infer
9o Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1940
Docket Book. Reed OT 1940 Docket Book and Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book contain
no record of the conference vote. McReynolds retired on February 1, 1941, two
days before the Darby decision was announced.
91 Conference Notes, No. 82, United States v. F.W. Darby Lumber Co., Dec. 21,
1940, Box 51, William 0. Douglas MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress;
Conference Notes, No. 82, United States v. F.W. Darby Lumber Co., Reel 123, Frank
Murphy MSS, University of Michigan.
92 Id.; Charles Evans Hughes to Harlan Fiske Stone, Jan. 27, 1941, Box 66, Harlan
Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
9 See Richard D. Friedman, The Sometimes-Bumpy Stream of Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 981, 999-1000 (2003).
9 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
9 312 U.S. at 134.
96 Opinion draft dated February 3, 1941, Box 66, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manu-
script Division, Library of Congress.
9 See Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The
Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1891, 1967
n.387 (1994).
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that the notice issue drove Hughes to the brink of dissent in Darby,
but where he was untroubled by such a concern in Opp, he found no
difficulty joining the majority. Yet the records of the Opp conference
pose difficulties for such an inference, for they record Hughes as
passing at the Opp conference vote as well.98 It would appear that
Hughes found "very careful and satisfactory" Stone's treatment of
the issues with which he specifically dealt in the Opp opinion, but
that he remained troubled by Stone's resolution in his Darby opinion
of the commerce power issue common to both cases.99
9 Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1940
Docket Book. Reed OT 1940 Docket Book and Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book contain
no record of the conference vote.
9 Concerning the National Labor Relations Act, three unanimous victories for the
NLRB also masked divisions at conference. In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (supporting NLRB ruling ordering interstate communication
company to cease commission of unfair labor practices), the vote in conference was
5-1, with Butler dissenting and McReynolds passing. Cardozo and Reed took no
part. Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Reed OT 1937 Docket Book. Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book contains
no record of the conference vote. Butler records Hughes as stating, "Different from
earlier cases. Requires close analysis. Strikes - no unfair practice. Employer not
bound to take them back. Findings show effort to reach agreement. Strike was in
support demand for better wages. [Section] 10c cease & desist from unfair labor
practice. Here [section] 8 3 relied on. Company announced would take all but 11.
Very important - knife edge - not bound to take any strikers. Sole point is that em-
ployer did not have the right to leave out labor leaders. If there must be discrimina-
tion must be against followers as pl case contends." On his return of Stone's
opinion McReynolds wrote, "I go along." Justice McReynolds, Return of NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Box 64, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Divi-
sion, Library of Congress. The conference vote was again 5-1 in Ford Motor Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 364 (1939) (supporting NLRB ruling ordering company to cease un-
fair labor practices), with Butler again dissenting, McReynolds again passing, and
Roberts, who did not participate in the decision, absent. Stone OT 1938 Docket
Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book. Brandeis OT
1938 Docket Book records the vote as 5-2, with McReynolds joining Butler in dis-
sent. Reed OT 1938 Docket Book contains no record of the conference vote. And at
the conference on NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Co., 309 U.S. 206 (1940) (holding
that the NLRB's findings were sufficient to support its ruling ordering company to
cease unfair labor practices), the vote was 6-2 to reverse, with McReynolds and
Roberts voting to affirm, and Hughes voting to reverse "in part." Murphy took no
part in the decision. Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Reed OT 1939 Docket Book; Doug-
las OT 1939 Docket Book, Douglas Conference Notes on No. 193, NLRB v. Waterman
Steamship Co., Box 39, William 0. Douglas MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Con-
gress. On his return of Black's opinion McReynolds wrote, "I disagree. A mere ques-
tion of fact that should be permitted to rest with the [lower court]. But I do not
wish to say anything on the subject." Justice McReynolds, Return of NLRB v.
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The appearance of consensus also was created after conference
in a number of decisions involving civil rights and civil liberties.
Cantwell v. Connecticut'00 unanimously incorporated the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment against the states and reversed
the convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for soliciting contributions
without a license in violation of a state statute, and for common
law breach of the peace. Stone and Douglas record the vote as
unanimous at conference, with Hughes passing.101 Stone wrote
"Fifth" next to his own vote and that of Reed. By this he apparently
meant the fifth count of the indictment, which was for common
law breach of the peace, as opposed to the third count, which was
for violation of the statute.1 02 Douglas records Stone and Reed as
voting to "reverse on 5 th count and affirm on 3rd*#103
Another civil rights case that became a landmark in the field of
federal courts was Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman. 1 0 4
There the justices unanimously reversed the decree of a federal dis-
trict court that had enjoined enforcement of a racially discrimina-
tory staffing order of the state railroad commission. The Texas
Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the question of whether the
order actually was authorized by the relevant state statute, how-
ever, and Frankfurter's opinion held that a federal court petitioned
for injunctive relief should abstain from creating "needless friction
with state policies that may result from tentative constructions of
state statutes and premature adjudication on their constitutional-
ity."1 05 The vote in conference to "Vacate and remand," 0 6 by
Waterman Steamship Co., Box 260, Hugo Black MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress. Hughes wrote on his return, "You have dealt with this case very thor-
oughly and I acquiesce." Chief Justice Hughes, Return of NLRB v. Waterman Steam-
ship Co., Box 260, Hugo Black MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
100 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
101 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939 Docket Book, Douglas Confer-
ence Notes on No. 632, Cantwell v. Connecticut, Box 39, William o. Douglas MSS,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Reed OT 1939 Docket Book contains no re-
cord of the conference vote. Hughes's opening remarks to the conference argued in
favor of affirmance. McReynolds followed stating, "I would reverse." Del Dickson,
The Supreme Court in Conference, 1940-1985, p. 392 (2001).
102 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book.
103 Douglas OT 1939 Docket Book.
1- 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
105 Id. at 497.
106 Stone OT 1940 Docket Book.
382 Vol. 55
THE HUGHES COURT DOCKET BOOKS: THE LATE TERMS
contrast, was not unanimous. Each of the docket books records
Roberts as passing,'07 and Roberts noted that Black agreed to the
disposition "with reservations." 08 Stone and Roberts place Hughes
in the majority, 09 but Douglas records the Chief as passing also," 0
and Murphy reports that Hughes remarked that he would "wait to
see [the] opinion.""' In the end, Hughes wrote on his return of
Frankfurter's opinion, "I acquiesce."112
In Pierre v. Louisiana," 3 the justices unanimously voided an in-
dictment of a black man for the murder of a white man issued by a
grand jury from which blacks had been systematically excluded. At
the February 11, 1939 conference, however, McReynolds and But-
ler had dissented.114 The grand jury and the original petit jury in the
case had been selected from the same discriminatory general ve-
nire. Subsequently, however, the trial judge sustained the defen-
dant's motion to quash the petit jury, but not to quash the
indictment. A new petit jury consisting of both whites and blacks
was selected, and that jury convicted the defendant. The Court
held that it had been error not to quash the indictment. Butler has
some notes on the case, which appear to express his own views
concerning the vote on certiorari the preceding October. Butler ap-
parently concluded that there had been no discrimination in the se-
lection of the petit jurors by which the defendant had been tried,
and that this was sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements.
On October 12 he wrote, "no qu as to petit jury. No proof of sys-
tematic exclusion of blacks." Also appearing in his notes is the fol-
lowing: "Negro convicted of murder alleged systematic exclusion of
negroes. Held petit juror [sic] bad. But that this rule did not apply
107 Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1940
Docket Book; Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book. Reed OT 1940 Docket Book contains
no record of the conference vote.
108 Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book.
1o9 Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book.
110 Douglas OT 1940 Docket Book.
111 Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book.
112 Felix Frankfurter Papers (Harvard Law School), Part I, reel 2, quoted in Edward
A. Purcell, Jr., Paradoxes of Court-Centered Legal History: Some Values of Historical
Understanding for a Practical Legal Education, 64 J. Leg. Educ. 229, 240 n.44 (2014).
113 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
114 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1938 Docket Book; Reed OT 1938 Docket Book.
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to Grand Jury - Then on trial negroes called. Seems enough." 1 In
the end, however, he and McReynolds joined the majority to make
a unanimous Court.
Records of conference votes in other unanimous decisions in-
volving criminal law and criminal procedure similarly reveal that
the initial instincts of McReynolds in such cases were not always re-
flected in the final votes. In Weiss v. United States," 6 for example,
the Court unanimously reversed convictions for conspiracy to com-
mit mail fraud that were obtained on the basis of evidence ac-
quired through illegal wiretaps. At the conference, however,
McReynolds had passed."17 Similarly, the Court in Smith v. Texas" 8
unanimously reversed the rape conviction of a black man indicted
by an all-white grand jury, but McReynolds had passed at the con-
ference vote."19 In Lovell v. City of Griffin,12 0 the Court unanimously
reversed the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for distribution of
pamphlet literature without a license. At the conference, however,
McReynolds passed and Butler voted to dismiss the appeal.1 2 1 But-
ler records both McReynolds and Sutherland as also speaking in
favor of dismissal, and in fact records a vote of 6-2 in favor of such a
disposition, with only Black and Reed in dissent. But there was also
a six-vote majority to reverse the conviction, and that was the
course that the justices ultimately chose. Butler records Hughes as
stating that the ordinance was "invalid," Brandeis characterizing it
as "bad," and Butler saying that it was "bad on its face" but that the
state court "did[n't] pass on [the] fed[eral] question."1 2 2 In Lanzetta
115 Butler OT 1938 Docket Book.
116 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
117 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Reed OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939
Docket Book.
118 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
119 Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; Reed OT 1940
Docket Book; Douglas OT 1940 Docket Book. Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book contains
no record of the conference vote. On his return of Black's circulated opinion,
McReynolds wrote, "I shall acquiesce." Justice McReynolds, Return of Smith v.
Texas, Box 264, Hugo Black MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
120 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Cardozo took no part in the decision.
121 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book. Reed OT 1937 Docket Book records
McReynolds as voting to reverse.
122 Butler OT 1937 Docket Book.
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v. New Jerseyl23 the Court unanimously struck down a statute crimi-
nalizing gang membership on vagueness grounds. This time the
conference vote was 4-3, with Hughes and Stone joining McRey-
nolds in dissent.124 And in Chambers v. Florida,125 the justices unan-
imously reversed a state murder conviction obtained on the basis
of a confession elicited under coercive circumstances. At the con-
ference, however, Reed was paired with the dissenting
McReynolds.126
123 306 U.S. 451 (1939). Frankfurter took no part in the decision. In United States
v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940), the Court unanimously affirmed the Second Circuit's
reversal of a conviction of the defendants for conspiracy to violate the revenue laws
by selling goods to a person whom they knew was going to use those goods to
make illegal alcohol. At the conference it seems that there were six votes to affirm,
with McReynolds, Roberts, and Frankfurter voting to dismiss. Stone OT 1940 Docket
Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; Reed OT 1940 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1940
Docket Book. Murphy records McReynolds and Roberts as voting to dismiss, and
Frankfurter as "prefer[ring]" dismissal but voting to affirm. Murphy OT1940 Docket
Book. Subsequent correspondence between Stone and Frankfurter tends to corrob-
orate Murphy's assessment of Frankfurter's flexibility, if not of his formal vote. See
Frankfurter to Stone, Dec. 3, 1940; Stone to Frankfurter, Dec. 3, 1940; and Justice
Frankfurter, Return of United States v. Falcone, Box 66, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. On his return of Stone's opinion, McRey-
nolds wrote, "I voted to dismiss. I shall not object to yr. opinion. It seems tight." Jus-
tice McReynolds, Return of United States v. Falcone, Box 66, Harlan Fiske Stone
MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
124 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938
Docket Book; Reed OT 1938 Docket Book. Brandeis was absent from the confer-
ence, and his docket book contains no record of the conference vote. Brandeis OT
1938 Docket Book. Butler records the following statement, probably made by
Hughes: "Sufficiency of evidence not involved. Sufficiency of statute - what is a
'gang' - what 'criminal purposes'."
125 309 U.S. 227 (1940). Murphy took no part.
126 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas Confer-
ence Notes on No. 195, Chambers v. Florida, Box 39, William 0. Douglas MSS, Manu-
script Division, Library of Congress. Reed OT 1939 Docket Book contains no record
of the conference vote. Following the decision in Chambers, the Court handed
down a number of per curiam decisions reversing convictions on its authority. See,
e.g., Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941), which was unanimous at conference,
Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; Murphy OT 1940
Docket Book; Reed OT 1940 Docket Book has no record of the conference vote, nor
does Douglas OT 1940 Docket Book, which simply notes, "reversed - per cur.";
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941), which was unanimous at conference, Stone
OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1940 Docket
Book; Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book (Reed OT 1940 Docket Book has no record of
the conference vote); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940), which Douglas reports
as "grant & reversed on Chambers v. Florida 3/9/40", Douglas OT 1939 Docket
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Finally, Reed also dissented, this time alone, at the conference
on Perkins v Elg.1 27 Ultimately the Court unanimously rebuffed an
attempt to deport as an illegal alien a woman born in the United
States to Swedish parents who had removed her to Sweden and re-
nounced their American citizenship during her minority, but only
because Reed suppressed his doubts. 12 8
Non-Unanimous Decisions with No Vote Changes
When one examines the major non-unanimous decisions of the
late Hughes Court in which there were no changes between the
conference vote and the final vote on the merits, one detects a
striking feature. With the exceptions of the Court's 8-1 decision in
Polka v. Connecticut 29 holding that the prohibition against double
jeopardy did not apply to the states, and the 7-1 decision in
Book, and Reed OT 1939 Docket Book records as "3/1: Granted and reversed per cu-
riam" (the Stone and Murphy docket books have no record of the vote). Vernon v.
Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941) was also a per curiam opinion following Chambers
that was unanimous in conference, Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940
Docket Book; Douglas OT 1940 Docket Book, though Douglas notes that "Stone
wanted [a] full opinion" in this case involving "an Alabama defendant who con-
fessed to murder after several late-night interrogations in secluded woods." Ross at
198. Reed OT 1940 Docket Book contains no record of the conference vote. It is
noteworthy that McReynolds was no longer on the Court that decided Lomax,
Smith, and Vernon.
127 307 U.S. 325 (1939). Douglas took no part in the decision.
128 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1938 Docket Book; Reed OT 1938 Docket Book. There
was apparently some discussion of whether the decree should be modified to in-
clude the Secretary of State in its declaratory provision. Brandeis has the notation
"Secy St." next to every member of the majority except for McReynolds and
Hughes. Next to McReynolds he wrote "Excl. Secy., and next to Hughes he wrote
"Incl. Secy." Stone wrote "Sec. of State" next to everyone except Reed and McRey-
nolds. Roberts wrote "S" next to everyone except Reed and McReynolds, and "no"
next to McReynolds. Butler does not record a vote for Hughes, and has a notation
next to McReynolds reading "Excluding Secy of State."
129 302 U.S. 277 (1937). Butler dissented without opinion. Stone OT 1937 Docket
Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT Docket Book. Brandeis OT 1937
Docket Book. Butler records Hughes as saying, 'What criterion to determine
whether double jeopardy is within DP of 14- 2 phases - ask ourselves - what is fun-
damental to justice," and expressing the Chief's view that the judgment should be
affirmed. There is extensive doodling on Roberts's page for Palko, giving the impres-
sion that he may have found the conference discussion tedious.
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Schneider v. Stateo30 invalidating municipal ordinances prohibiting
distribution of handbills on public streets, all of them concern is-
sues of political economy.13 1 With respect to much of this portion
of the Court's docket, the justices knew their minds, had strong
views, and were disinclined to accommodate colleagues with
whom they disagreed.
This pattern can be observed in several of the late Hughes
Court's labor decisions. In Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB,13 2
where the Court upheld application of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) to striking warehousemen at a fruit packing plant,
McReynolds and Butler were the sole dissenters both at conference
and from the published decision.133 Later that year the Court de-
cided Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,13 4 which upheld application
of the NLRA to an electrical power company. Though there were
again no vote changes between the conference and the final deci-
sion, the dynamics within the conference were more complex. The
conference vote was 6-2 to affirm the Circuit Court's judgment up-
holding the Board's order, with McReynolds and Butler
130 308 U.S. 147 (1939). McReynolds dissented without opinion. Stone OT 1939
Docket Book; Reed OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939 Docket Book.
131 Another arguable exception is Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,
307 U.S. 496 (1939), where the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment secured
the freedom of labor organizers to assemble peacefully to discuss labor issues. The
vote in conference was 5-1 to affirm, with Butler voting to reverse, McReynolds vot-
ing to dismiss, and Frankfurter and Douglas not participating. Stone OT 1938 Docket
Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Reed OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938
Docket Book. Roberts records that the case was initially brought up on March 4,
after Brandeis had retired, and passed over. The case was again brought before the
conference on April 15, two days before Douglas assumed his office. Roberts re-
cords the disposition that day as "Modify & affirm," with the vote just as Stone and
Butler recorded it. Though there were no vote changes between the conference
and the published opinion, the five justices in the conference majority splintered
into three different opinions. 307 U.S. at 500-32.
132 303 U.S. 453 (1938). Cardozo and Reed took no part.
u3 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book. Butler records Hughes as stating,
"Finding not contested. Contest is made as application of the Act. 39 1/2 i.c. [mean-
ing 39 1/2% of the company's product was shipped in interstate commerce]." Butler
then inserted in brackets "[Does effect of the unfair labor practice affect interstate
commerce.]" Hughes continued, "See two Coronado Cases. Not % in each case.
Must be substantial. Cited close distinction in FELA cases." Reed OT 1937 Docket
Book simply records, "Disqualified."
1- 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
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dissenting. 35 There was a division among the majority, however,
concerning whether the Board was without authority to issue the
portion of its order contained in paragraph "f." Black and Reed
maintained that the Board had such authority, whereas Hughes,
Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts maintained that it did not. 36 The
Court ultimately affirmed and modified the judgment, holding that
the paragraph "f" of the Board's order was invalid. Butler and
McReynolds agreed that paragraph "f" was invalid, but dissented
from the Court's holding that the Board had jurisdiction over the
company.1 37 And Reed and Black concurred in all of the Court's
opinion other than the portion modifying the order.' 38 Butler's
notes record Hughes as stating at the conference, "'f' goes too far.
'g' [another portion of the Board's order that the Court upheld] ex-
plain. Modify & [aflfirm." Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts expressed
agreement with Hughes. Black expressed his preference for affir-
mance in toto, and Reed signaled his agreement with Black. Butler,
of course, indicated that he favored reversal. Most interesting,
however, is Butler's unusual account of the participation of McRey-
nolds. When it came his turn to speak, the curmudgeonly Justice
apparently reported that he had "nothing to say."139
13s Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1938 Docket Book.
136 Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book records "modify" next to the "affirm" votes of
Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, and himself. Stone records "and modify" next to the "af-
firm" votes of Hughes, Brandeis, and Roberts. Butler OT 1938 Docket Book records
"mod. & af." next to the votes of Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts. Butler
wrote "Af. i.e. uphold the Bd's order (f) striking down the contracts" next to the
votes of Black and Reed. Reed OT 1938 Docket Book records Black and Reed as vot-
ing to "Affirm absolutely," and Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts as voting to af-
firm "with reservations of modification."
137 305 U.S. at 239-44.
138 305 U.S. at 244-50.
139 Butler OT 1938 Docket Book. Three other labor decisions of the 1938 Term
merit brief mention. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939), held
that participation by employees in a sit-down strike was good cause for discharge.
Both the conference vote and the final vote on the merits were 5-2, with Stone con-
curring in part, Black and Reed dissenting in part, and Frankfurter not participating.
Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book. Butler OT 1938 Docket
Book records the same vote, but places a question mark next to Stone's vote to af-
firm. Reed OT 1938 Docket Book recorded the vote as 4-2, with a question mark
rather than a vote in Stone's column. Both NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332
(1939) and NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939)
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In New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 14 0 the Court held
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the federal District Court of
jurisdiction to issue an injunction in a case in which an African-
American association picketed a grocer that did not employ any
black clerks. Here again, McReynolds and Butler were the lone dis-
senters both at conference and from the published decision.141 But-
ler's notes indicate that the issue that divided the Court, both at
conference and in the published opinions, was whether the dispute
was a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Act.1 4 2 New Negro
Alliance was anticipated by Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 43 where the
Court held that the federal District Court had exceeded its jurisdic-
tion in issuing an injunction against a union picketing an employer
because of its refusal to recognize the union as the exclusive bar-
gaining agent for its employees. The vote in conference was 5-3,
with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler dissenting. Sutherland re-
tired before the decision was handed down, but McReynolds and
Butler adhered to the positions that they had taken in confer-
ence.144 Here again Butler's notes indicate that the issue that di-
vided the justices in conference as well as in the published opinions
affirmed decisions that Labor Board findings that employers had engaged in unfair
labor practices were not supported by the evidence. The vote in each case was 5-2,
with Black and Reed dissenting and Frankfurter taking no part. Butler records the
vote in Columbian Enameling as identical with the final vote, but Stone and Roberts
record Reed as passing, and Reed placed a question mark in his own column. Rob-
erts records the conference vote in Sands as identical with the final vote, as does
Stone, though Stone placed a question mark next to his own vote to affirm. Butler
recorded Reed as passing, while Reed records himself as dissenting but places a
question mark rather than a vote in Stone's column. Brandeis had retired, and so
did not vote in any of these three cases. Douglas had not yet replaced him. Stone
OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book;
Reed OT 1938 Docket Book.
140 303 U.S. 552 (1938). Cardozo took no part.
141 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book. Reed OT 1937 Docket Book records
only Reed's own vote to reverse.
142 Butler OT 1937 Docket Book. Brandeis recorded "labor dispute" next to the
votes of every member of the majority except Reed, who appears to have preferred
to place the decision on some other ground. Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book.
143 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
144 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book. Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book makes it impossible to see Black's vote
because of a paste-over, but otherwise it is in accord with the records of the other
justices.
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was whether the conflict was a "labor dispute" within the meaning
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.1 4 5 Finally, in Apex Hosiery v. Leader,1 4 6
Hughes, McReynolds, and Roberts dissented both at conference
and in the published report from the Court's holding that the Sher-
man Act did not apply to laborers engaged in a sit-down strike.14 7
Such stability between the conference vote and the final vote on
the merits also can be seen in some of the Court's later decisions
concerning agricultural regulation. In Currin v. Wallace,'1 4 8 where the
Court upheld provisions of the Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935 regu-
lating both interstate and intrastate sales, McReynolds and Butler
registered the only dissents both at conference and from the pub-
lished decision.149 Similarly, in Mulford v. Smith,'s0 where the Court
upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Butler records him-
self and McReynolds as isolated in dissent at conference.' 5 ' And in
H.P. Hood & Sons v. United States,15 2 which upheld orders issued pur-
suant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, Roberts joined
145 Butler OT 1937 Docket Book.
14 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
147 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939 Docket Book. Reed OT 1939
Docket Book contains no record of the conference vote.
14 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
149 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1938 Docket Book; Reed OT 1938 Docket Book.
150 307 U.S. 38 (1939).
151 Butler OT 1938 Docket Book. Reed OT 1938 Docket Book similarly records the
conference vote as 5-2 to affirm, with McReynolds and Butler in dissent and Hughes
and Brandeis not voting. Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book contains no record of the
conference vote. Stone's record of the conference vote is unclear. There are some
erasure marks where Frankfurter's name was inserted by hand in place of Cardozo's,
which appear to erase votes to affirm by Reed and Frankfurter. Assuming that But-
ler is correct that these two justices voted in conference as they did in the published
decision, the conference vote was at least 5-2 to affirm, with McReynolds and But-
ler dissenting. Butler records the vote as 6-2, but Stone records no vote for Hughes.
Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Stone 0T 1938 Docket Book. Mulford was argued on
March 8 and decided on April 17. 307 U.S. 38. Hughes was absent from the Court
due to illness from March 4 to April 15, and therefore was not present for the
March 11 Mulford conference. See Hughes Attends Court Conference, Wash. Post,
April 16, 1939, p. 3 ("Chief Justice Hughes attended a conference of the Supreme
Court justices yesterday. It was his first visit to the Court since he became ill with
grippe March 4.")
1s2 307 U.S. 588 (1939).
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McReynolds and Butler in dissent both at conference and in the pub-
lished decision.153
A similar persistence in voting behavior is evidenced by a quartet
of decisions sustaining other New Deal initiatives. In Electric Bond
& Shore Co. v. SEC,1 5 4 where the justices upheld provisions of
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 requiring such compa-
nies to register with the SEC, McReynolds cast the lone dissenting
vote both at conference and from the published decision. 55 In
United States v. Bekins,15 6 which upheld the Municipal Bankruptcy
Act by a vote of 6-2, McReynolds and Butler also were alone in
dissent at the conference.' 57 McReynolds and Butler again were
consistently alone in dissent in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Authority,15  which turned back yet another
challenge to the TVA. 59 And in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
1s3 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT Docket
Book; Douglas 0T 1938 Docket Book. Roberts, Stone, and Douglas record the con-
ference vote as 6-3, with Douglas in the majority. Butler records the vote as 5-3,
with the retired Brandeis not voting, and with no voting column for Douglas, who
had joined the Court three weeks before the May 8, 1939 vote. Douglas notes that
Roberts voted with the minority "on ground of delegation." Reed OT 1938 Docket
Book contains no record of the conference vote.
1- 303 U.S. 419 (1938). Cardozo and Reed took no part in the decision.
1ss Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book; Reed OT 1937 Docket Book. Stone,
Butler, Roberts, and Reed all record the vote as 6-1, with the ailing Cardozo absent
and Reed not participating. Brandeis does not record a vote for Hughes, but records
Hughes as stating, "Qu - are prs [petitioners] subject to congressional regulation.
EB&S and others under it & Ebasco have extensive use of mails. See prs brief p. 11
prs reply brief concession yes directly engaged in i.c. (at least EB&S, Ebasco, Am.
Gas & three others).... Denials in decree are penalties for failure to give its infor-
mation - not so arbitrary as to deny due process."
1s6 304 U.S. 27 (1938). Cardozo took no part in the decision.
1s7 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler 0T 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Reed OT 1937 Docket Book. Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book contains
no record of the conference vote.
15s 306 U.S. 118 (1939). Reed took no part in the decision.
1s9 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1938 Docket Book. Roberts also re-
cords Butler as voting with McReynolds to reverse, though his record contains a
crossed-out vote to affirm in Butler's column, suggesting the possibility of a
changed vote. Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book. Butler records the December 3 vote
as 4-2 (rather than 5-2 as the others do), with Reed "out," Brandeis not voting, and
Cardozo not yet replaced by Frankfurter. Reed OT 1938 Docket Book records McRey-
nolds as not voting, Reed as "Disq.", and all others voting to affirm. Butler records
Hughes as presenting the case and, after several remarks, concluding "Case is
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v. Adkins,160 McReynolds was the lone dissenter both at conference
and from the final decision upholding the National Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1937.161 The New Dealers were dealt a blow, by
contrast, when in Morgan / the Court held that a hearing con-
ducted under the auspices of the Secretary of Agriculture had failed
to satisfy "basic concepts of fair play." 162 This time it was Black who
was alone in dissent both at conference and in the published
decision.163
Finally, a quartet of decisions concerning state regulation and
taxation likewise saw no changes between the conference vote and
the final vote on the merits. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson16 held that a California tax imposed on a Connecticut cor-
poration for the privilege of doing business within the state vio-
lated the Due Process Clause. Black cast the lone dissenting vote
both at conference and from the published opinion.165 Milk Control
Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products' 66 upheld Pennsylvania's Milk
Control Law against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge by a
vote of 7-2, with McReynolds and Butler dissenting both at the
conference and from the published opinion.16 7 In Madden v. Ken-
tucky,168 the Court upheld a state tax against equal protection and
privileges or immunities challenges and partially overruled Colgate
controlled by Ala Co. v. Ickes - Did pis have any right to be free from comp. PIs have
no right like cert of con of necessity."
160 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
161 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939 Docket Book. Reed OT 1939
Docket Book contains no record of the conference vote.
162 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1938). Cardozo and Reed took no part
in the decision.
163 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts 0T 1937
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book. Reed OT 1937 Docket Book contains
no record of the conference vote.
16 303 U.S. 77 (1938). Cardozo took no part in the decision.
165 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts 0T 1937 Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937
Docket Book. Butler OT 1937 Docket Book contains no record of the conference
vote.
166 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
167 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1938
Docket Book; Reed OT 1938 Docket Book. Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book also re-
cords the conference vote as 7-2, though there is a mark in Butler's "Reverse" col-
umn suggesting the possibility that he may initially have voted with the majority.
18 309 U.S. 83 (1940). Hughes published a brief concurrence.
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v. Harvey.' 69 McReynolds and Roberts, remaining members of the
dwindling Colgate majority, dissented alone both at the conference
and from the published decision.170 And in Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co.,171 the Court held that an oil prora-
tion order of the Texas Railroad Commission did not deprive the
company of its property without due process, and effectively over-
ruled Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp.172 The vote both
in the conference and in the published decision was 6-3, with the
last remaining members of the Thompson majority - Hughes,
McReynolds, and Roberts - in dissent.173
Non-Unanimous Decisions With Vote Changes
Alongside these instances of voting stability one finds numerous
cases in which the justices of the late Hughes Court altered their
votes between the conference and the final decision. Among these
cases are some of the period's major constitutional landmarks. For
example, Erie Railroad v. Tompkinsl 74 overruled Swift v. Tyson17s
and held that federal courts sitting in diversity were required to
apply the decisional law of state courts. The conference vote was
5-2 to reverse, with Black and Reed voting to affirm the judgment
of the lower court. The ailing Cardozo was absent, McReynolds
passed, and Butler voted with the majority in favor of reversal.176
169 296 U.S. 404 (1935) (invalidating a state tax by a vote of 6-3 on the ground
that it violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
170 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Reed OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939
Docket Book.
171 310 U.S. 573 (1940).
172 300 U.S. 55 (1937) (unanimously invalidating oil proration order of Texas Rail-
road Commission on the ground that it deprived the company of property without
due process).
173 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939 Docket Book. Reed OT 1939
Docket Book contains no record of the conference vote.
174 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Cardozo took no part in the decision.
175 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
176 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book. Reed 0T 1937 Docket Book records
the vote as 6-2, with McReynolds in the majority. Butler records Hughes as stating
in his presentation, 'Very thin on con[tributory] neg[ligence] but very good judge."
Next Hughes "explained Penn case alleged [permissive or persuasive] - not recog-
nized in this state - if that is local law - then no case - B & 0 v. Baugh - fellow ser-
vant case - Buetler Case followed Baugh case - Breslin Case - Penn rule explicit. if
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Next to the votes of Black and Reed, Butler wrote, "Penn law but
for pl." These two Roosevelt appointees apparently agreed that
Swift should be overruled, but believed that the Railroad was liable
to Mr. Tompkins under the applicable Pennsylvania decisional law.
Neither of these justices expressed such views in the published de-
cision. Black joined the majority opinion, and Reed wrote sepa-
rately to express his concurrence in the result and the reasoning of
that opinion except insofar as it maintained that the course previ-
ously pursued by federal courts had been unconstitutional.17 7
McReynolds ultimately joined Butler's opinion defending Swift and
concluding that its constitutional validity "need not be considered,
because under the law, as found by the courts of Pennsylvania and
generally throughout the country, it is plain that the evidence re-
quired a finding that plaintiff was guilty of negligence that contrib-
uted to cause his injuries and that the judgment below should be
reversed upon that ground."1 7 8
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 179 the Court upheld the
federal Filled Milk Act of 1923, which prohibited the interstate
transportation of the substance for which it was named. In the final
decision, only McReynolds dissented. Black concurred in the result
and all of the opinion except for the Part labeled "Third" - the por-
tion containing the famous Footnote Four. Butler wrote a separate
opinion concurring in the result. At the conference, however, Butler
in statute would be followed in fed[eral] case." The reference to "B & 0 v. Baugh" is
to Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893), in which the Court held that
general rather than local law governed a suit brought in diversity against the rail-
road by an employee injured by the negligence of his fellow servant. The reference
to "Buetler Case" is to Buetler v. Grand Trunk Junction Ry. Co., 224 U.S. 85 (1912), a
brief Holmes opinion in which the Court unanimously followed Baugh and applied
the general law fellow-servant rule to a tort suit brought in diversity. The reference
to "Breslin Case" is to the recent First Circuit decision in Boston & Maine Rd. v. Bre-
slin, 80 F.2d 749 (1st. Cir. 1935), cert. den. 297 U.S. 715, which was relied upon by
the Railroad in its brief. Brief on Behalf of Petitioner Erie Railroad Co., Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, at 43. There the court applied the judge-made law of the lex loci to
a tort suit brought under federal diversity jurisdiction.
177 304 U.S. at 90-91.
178 304 U.S. at 80-90. On a separate page pasted into Butler's entry for Erie ap-
pears "p. 7 [presumably of Brandeis's circulated draft]. If only a question of statu-
tory construction was involved, we should not be prepared to abandon etc." Butler
OT 1937 Docket Book.
1' 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Cardozo and Reed did not participate in the decision.
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recorded himself as passing, 180 and the account of Roberts corrob-
orates Butler's record.'" Stone apparently understood things dif-
ferently, and listed Butler as in dissent.182 Whatever the case,
Butler ultimately acquiesced in the judgment of the majority. In
United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc.,'8 3 another of the pe-
riod's many dairy-related decisions, it was Stone who was on the
move. There a divided Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act and a minimum milk price
order issued pursuant to its authority. Stone and Frankfurter joined
Reed's opinion for the Court, with Black and Douglas concurring
specially, and Hughes, McReynolds, Butler, and Roberts dissenting.
At conference, however, the vote had been evenly divided, with
Stone passing.1 84
There was also a great deal of fluidity in the rapidly-developing
domain of intergovernmental tax immunities. In Helvering v. Moun-
tain Producers Corporation, 85 the federal government had granted
land to the state of Wyoming for the purpose of supporting com-
mon schools. The state in turn leased some of the land to the cor-
poration for the purpose of extracting oil and gas. The state
reserved a royalty, and the balance of the income from production
at the site flowed to the company. The majority held that the cor-
poration was not an instrumentality of the state so as to render its
180 Butler OT 1937 Docket Book. Butler records Hughes as citing "238/446 Boric
Acid," a reference to Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446 (1915), which upheld a prohibition
on the sale of food preservatives containing boric acid. That case, Hughes indicated,
stood for the proposition that such a statute was "good unless palpably without
foundation." Here, Hughes argued, "On face of statute] can't be said it is invalid,"
adding that "If [the statute had] no basis in reason [that] is [a] defense" to prosecu-
tion. Hughes also raised the issue of "deception" in the marketing of filled milk, and
cited the precedent of Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192 (1912) (up-
holding state liquor regulation).
181 Roberts OT 1937 Docket Book. Reed OT 1937 Docket Book lists the vote as 5-0
to reverse, with Butler not voting, Reed "disqualified," and Cardozo absent. Reed
recorded no vote for McReynolds.
182 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book.
183 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
184 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938
Docket Book (showing a dot rather than a check mark in Stone's "affirm" column);
Douglas OT 1938 Docket Book. Reed OT 1938 Docket Book contains no record of
the conference vote.
185 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
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income constitutionally immune from federal taxation, and ex-
pressly overruled two contrary precedents.18 6 The final vote was
5-2, with McReynolds and Butler dissenting, and Cardozo and Reed
not participating. At the conference, there had been five votes for
the ultimate disposition, but the other four justices did not vote.
Both Butler and Cardozo were absent; former Solicitor General
Reed sat the vote out; and McReynolds passed.8 7
In Helvering v. Gerhardt,18 the Court held that the salaries of a
construction engineer and two assistant general managers employed
by the New York Port Authority were subject to federal income taxa-
tion. The vote in the decision was 5-2, with McReynolds and Butler
dissenting, and Cardozo and Reed taking no part. At the conference,
however, the vote had been 4-2. Both Stone and Roberts record
Hughes as not voting;' 89 Butler records Hughes in the majority, but
he records no vote for Black.' 90 It appears that the records of Stone
and Roberts are more likely correct. First, Black indicated in his pub-
lished concurrence that he was prepared to re-examine the Court's
entire line of intergovernmental tax immunity jurisprudence from
top to bottom.191 It seems unlikely that his vote in Gerhardt was ever
in doubt. Second, the Gerhardt Court reversed the Second Circuit,
but Butler records Hughes as concluding his presentation to the con-
ference with the statement, "Affirm."1 92 After Hughes spoke he
heard several of his colleagues speak and vote in favor of reversal. It
seems likely that the Chief Justice, who voted last, was in some
doubt when the time came to cast his conference vote.
Part of the Gerhardt discussion concerned a case that the Court
had decided the previous year, Brush v. Commissioner.19 3 There the
186 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932); Gillespie v. Oklahoma,
257 U.S. 501 (1922).
187 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937 Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937
Docket Book. Butler OT 1937 Docket Book contains no record of the conference
vote. Reed OT 1937 Docket Book simply records, "Not voting."
18 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
189 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937 Docket Book.
190 Butler OT 1937 Docket Book. Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book and Reed OT
1937 Docket Book contain no record of the conference vote.
191 304 U.S. at 424-27.
192 Butler OT 1937 Docket Book. Butler records Hughes's presentation thusly:
"Stated case. Is agency free fr[om] tax if yes then these men are - ? Affirm."
193 300 U.S. 352 (1937).
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Court held that the salary of the Chief Engineer of New York City's
Bureau of Water Supply was constitutionally immune from federal
income taxation, and Hughes had joined the majority opinion. At
the conference the vote had been 6-2 to reverse, with Brandeis
and Roberts dissenting and Stone passing.1 94 Stone placed a ques-
tion mark next to Cardozo's vote to reverse,195 and the two of them
ultimately concurred in the result on the non-constitutional ground
that Brush's salary was exempted under a Treasury regulation the
validity of which had not been challenged by the Government. 96
Roberts, joined by Brandeis, published a dissent in which he main-
tained that Brush's salary was subject to taxation under a proper
understanding of the principles of intergovernmental immunity.1 97
At the Gerhardt conference Butler summarized Roberts's remarks
this way: "Goes on his dissent in Brush case." 98 In Gerhardt,
Roberts joined Stone's opinion expressly limiting Brush to its non-
constitutional foundations.199
Gerhardt was followed in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 200
which held that the salary of an examining attorney employed by
the Federal Home Owners' Loan Corporation was subject to non-
discriminatory taxation by the state of his residence. At the confer-
ence the vote was 5-2, with McReynolds and Butler dissenting.
Brandeis had retired and Douglas had not yet been confirmed, and
the ailing Hughes was absent.2 0 1 Ultimately the decision was 6-2,
19 Stone OT 1936 Docket Book; Butler OT 1936 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1936
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1936 Docket Book contains no record of the conference
vote.
19s Stone OT 1936 Docket Book.
196 300 U.S. at 374 ("We concur in the result upon the ground that the petitioner
has brought himself within the terms of the exemption prescribed by Treasury Reg-
ulation 74, Article 643, which, for the purposes of this case, may be accepted as
valid, its validity not being challenged by counsel for the government. In the ab-
sence of such a challenge, no opinion is expressed as to the need for revision of the
doctrine of implied immunities declared in earlier decisions. We leave that subject
open.")
197 300 U.S. at 374-78.
's Butler OT 1937 Docket Book.
'9 304 U.S. at 422-23.
2- 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
201 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book; Reed OT 1938
Docket Book. None of these records a vote for Hughes. Butler OT 1938 Docket Book
records Hughes as "ab," and does not record a vote for Reed. O'Keefe was argued
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with Hughes concurring in the result and Frankfurter writing a con-
curring opinion. The majority expressly overruled 2 0 2 the venerable
precedent of Collector v. Day2o3 and the very recent decision of
New York ex re. Rogers v, Graves.20 4
At the Gerhardt conference Roberts also stated that he was
"Sorry he agreed with Evans Case," 2 0 5 referring to the 1920 decision
in Evans v. Gore 206 holding that a federal statute taxing the income
of a federal district judge confirmed before its enactment worked
an unconstitutional diminution of his compensation while in office
in violation of Article Ill, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. In 1925, Miles v.
Graham had extended Evans to prohibit taxation of the income of
federal judges confirmed after enactment of the taxing statute.2 07
Evans would be limited, and Miles v. Graham overruled, in the
1939 case of O'Malley v. Woodrough.208 There the Court held that a
provision of the Revenue Act of 1936 that re-enacted a provision of
the Revenue Act of 1932 taxing the income of federal judges con-
firmed after June 6, 1932 was constitutional as applied to judges
confirmed after that date.
At the O'Malley conference, in which McReynolds did not partici-
pate, only Butler voted to preserve Miles and invalidate the tax. 2 09
Among the remaining justices the discussion centered on whether
to overrule only Miles, or to include Evans on the chopping block as
well. Here the reports diverge in their details. Stone records Rob-
erts, Frankfurter, and Reed as favoring the former path, voting to
on March 6 and decided on March 27. 306 U.S. 466. Hughes was absent from the
Court due to illness from March 4 to April 15, and therefore was not present for the
March 11 O'Keefe conference. See Hughes Attends Court Conference, Wash. Post,
April 16, 1939, p. 3 ("Chief Justice Hughes attended a conference of the Supreme
Court justices yesterday. It was his first visit to the Court since he became ill with
grippe March 4.")
202 306 U.S. at 486.
203 11 Wall. 113 (1871).
20 299 U.S. 401 (1937) (holding the salary of the general counsel of the Panama
Railroad Company immune from state taxation).
205 Butler OT 1937 Docket Book.
206 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
207 268 U.S. 501 (1925).
208 307 U.S. 277 (1939). McReynolds took no part in the decision.
209 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938
Docket Book; Douglas OT 1938 Docket Book.
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uphold the tax as applied to judges confirmed "since 1932."210 But-
ler attributed this position to Hughes, Roberts, and Frankfurter,211
and Roberts ascribed this view to himself, Reed, and Douglas. 212
Reed listed Hughes, Roberts, himself, and Frankfurter as voting to
"overrule Graham" only, and Douglas recorded only Reed and
Frankfurter as favoring this disposition. 2 13 Both Butler and Stone
record Black alone as voting to "overrule both" Miles and Evans, 2 14
while Roberts adds to this list Frankfurter and Stone. 2 15 Reed listed
Black, Stone, and Douglas as voting to "Generally overrule Evans v.
Gore," and Douglas's account accords with Reed's. 2 16 Stone records
himself and Hughes as stating that they would be content "either
way," 2 1 7 while Douglas notes that "Hughes and Roberts would join
in above if opinion were written broadly [i.e., overruling both Miles
and Evans] but prefer narrower ground." 2 18 In Frankfurter's pub-
lished opinion the Court expressly overruled only Miles, though it
did include some language indicating disapproval of Evans, and no
justice wrote separately to argue that Evans should be overruled.
In the field of labor relations, NLRB v. Fainblatt219 upheld applica-
tion of the NLRA to a company processing materials into women's
sports garments on a contract basis. Only McReynolds and Butler
dissented from the published opinion. The reports of the confer-
ence votes differ, but each of them depicts a Court that was fluid
between the conference vote and the final vote on the merits.
Stone records himself, Roberts, Black, Reed, and Frankfurter in the
210 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book. Stone has an illegible notation next to Douglas's
vote to reverse.
211 Butler OT 1938 Docket Book. Butler initially recorded Douglas as voting to
overrule only Miles, but then crossed his vote out.
212 Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book.
213 Douglas OT 1938 Docket Book.
214 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book.
215 Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book.
216 Douglas OT 1938 Docket Book ("Black, Douglas, & Stone [would] Reverse &
overrule Evans v. Gore & Miles v. Graham").
217 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book.
218 Douglas OT 1938 Docket Book. Douglas records Hughes as stating the case,
"(1) Retroactivity argument of no avail. (2) Either tax is a diminution or it is not. If
not diminution no question. If it is, nevertheless it is a valid deduction from salary.
In either event Wood rough must pay. Evans v. Gore not involved."
219 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
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majority, McReynolds and Butler in dissent, and the ailing and
absent Hughes as not voting. 2 20 Roberts's record is similar, though
he records himself as passing also.2 2 1 Reed's account corroborates
that of Roberts.222 And Butler records himself as alone in dissent,
with Roberts and McReynolds passing, and Hughes not voting.2 2 3 It
appears that in March of 1939 Roberts may have been uncertain
whether Fainblatt's operations lay within the scope of congressio-
nal power over interstate commerce. 2 2 4
220 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book. Brandeis had retired, and Douglas had not yet
been confirmed as his replacement.
221 Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book.
222 Reed OT 1938 Docket Book.
223 Butler OT 1938 Docket Book.
224 Two other labor relations cases are worthy of brief mention. In United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), the Court held that a trade union's secondary
boycott did not violate the Sherman Act. The case was decided by a vote of 5-2,
with Hughes and Roberts dissenting. McReynolds retired two days before the deci-
sion was announced and took no part in it. Former Attorney General Murphy also
took no part. Stone recorded the conference vote as 6-2, with Murphy in the major-
ity. Stone OT 1940 Docket Book. Roberts recorded the vote as 5-2, adding the note,
"Murphy takes no part." However, it appears that Murphy may initially have voted,
as Roberts placed a check mark in Murphy's "affirm" column that was then crossed
out. (Roberts's entry also contains a crossed-out vote to reverse for Black, who
voted with the majority to affirm.) Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book. Douglas OT 1940
Docket Book records the vote as 5-2 with McReynolds passing and Murphy not par-
ticipating. Murphy did not record the conference vote, though he did write
"disqualified" next to his own name. Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book. Reed OT 1940
Docket Book contains no records of the conference vote.
It appears that Murphy may also have been uncertain about whether he should
participate in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dai-
ries, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941). There the Court upheld over First Amendment objec-
tions an injunction against union picketing that had been accompanied by violence.
The vote was 5-3, with Justices Black, Douglas, and Reed dissenting, and the
recently-retired McReynolds not yet replaced. Roberts recorded the vote as 6-3.at
the December 21, 1940 conference, Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book, with both
McReynolds and Murphy in the majority and Douglas, Reed, and Black in dissent.
Stone, however, again provides a different account. He records Frankfurter, Roberts,
and himself as voting to affirm; Black, Reed, and Douglas to reverse; Hughes both
to affirm and reverse; and McReynolds not voting. Stone also has no recorded vote
for Murphy, though there is an erased vote to affirm in Murphy's column. Stone OT
1940 Docket Book. Reed OT 1940 Docket Book and Douglas OT 1940 Docket Book
record the vote as 5-3, with no recorded vote for Murphy. Justice Murphy himself
records the vote as 5-3 with McReynolds voting in the majority. In his column ap-
pears the notation, "absent - your vote not needed." Murphy OT 1940 Docket
Book. Irrespective of whether Murphy's vote was needed, the published report con-
tains no indication that he did not participate.
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The 1939 decision of Coleman v. Miller2 25 concerned the status
of the proposed Child Labor Amendment, which Congress had
passed in 1924, but which had yet to be ratified by the requisite
number of states. In January of 1925, the Kansas state legislature
had adopted a resolution rejecting the proposed amendment. In
January of 1937, however, the state senate had divided evenly on
a resolution to ratify the amendment, and the state's Lieutenant
Governor had cast the deciding vote in favor of ratification.
The lower house then adopted a resolution of ratification. Mem-
bers of the legislature claiming that the Lieutenant Governor had
no right to vote on the senate resolution brought an action in
mandamus seeking to restrain various state officers from taking
steps to certify that the legislature had ratified the amendment.
The petition also contended that the proposed amendment was
stale and no longer subject to ratification because it had not been
ratified within a reasonable time. The state supreme court found
that the Lieutenant Governor had been entitled to vote on the
resolution, that the proposed amendment remained vital
and subject to ratification, and that the legislature had ratified the
amendment. That court therefore denied the writ of
mandamus. 22 6
The threshold question before the Supreme Court of the United
States was whether the Court had jurisdiction of the controversy.
More particularly, the issue was whether the members of the state
legislature who had brought the action had standing to seek a writ
of certiorari. In the published opinion the Court split on this issue
5-4, with Roberts, Black, and Douglas joining Frankfurter's opinion
maintaining that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the peti-
tioners lacked standing. 227 The numerical vote had been the same
at the April 22nd conference, but with a different line-up. There
McReynolds had taken the view that there was no jurisdiction, and
Roberts had voted to recognize jurisdiction. These two justices
switched places between the conference and the final decision. 2 28
22s 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
226 307 U.S. at 435-37.
227 307 U.S. at 460-70 (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
228 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938
Docket Book; Douglas OT 1938 Docket Book; Reed OT 1938 Docket Book.
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The second question was whether to affirm the judgment of the
state court on the merits. Here the vote in the published decision
was 7-2. Hughes's opinion for the Court held that the question of
whether the ratification of the amendment was effective in view of
its earlier rejection by the state legislature was a political question
to be determined by Congress. 229 Hughes further opined that the
question of whether the amendment had lost its vitality through
lapse of time was similarly non-justiciable.2 30 Roberts, Frankfurter,
and Douglas joined Black's concurring opinion, which underscored
their view that Congress alone held exclusive power over the politi-
cal process of constitutional amendment, and that the courts had
no business pronouncing upon that process. 2 3 1 McReynolds joined
Butler's dissent, which maintained that the proposed amendment
was no longer subject to ratification because it had not been rati-
fied within a reasonable time. Butler's opinion did not speak to the
issue of the legislature's previous rejection of the proposed amend-
ment. 2 3 2 Here again, however, the ultimate vote was at variance
with the conference tally. At the conference, McReynolds had not
voted on the merits, passing because of his view that the Court did
not have jurisdiction of the case. Stone and Roberts had been with
Butler in dissent, though it appears from the question marks that
Stone placed next to his and Roberts's votes that their votes to re-
verse had been tentative.2 33 Stone ultimately joined Hughes on the
merits, and Roberts ultimately joined Black. The deserted Butler
had to be consoled by McReynolds's election to join him in dissent.
There was a third merits issue in Coleman that was not disaggre-
gated in the conference tallies but was given brief, separate treat-
ment in Hughes's opinion. The petitioners claimed that the
Lieutenant Governor was not a part of the "legislature" under the
Kansas constitution as it had been construed by the state's highest
court, and therefore was not eligible under Article V of the federal
229 307 U.S. at 447-51.
230 307 at 451-56.
231 307 U.S. at 456-60 (Black, J., concurring).
232 307 U.S. at 470-74 (Butler, J. dissenting).
233 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938 Docket
Book; Douglas OT 1938 Docket Book. Butler did not record a vote for Stone on the
merits. Reed OT 1938 Docket Book records the merits vote as 6-2, with Butler and
Roberts in dissent, and McReynolds not voting.
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Constitution to cast the deciding vote on ratification. Hughes
reported that "[w]hether this contention presents a justiciable con-
troversy, or a question which is political in its nature and hence
not justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally di-
vided and therefore the Court expresses no opinion upon that
point." 234
Scholars understandably have been puzzled by how a decision
in which all nine of the justices participated could have been
"equally divided" on this issue. Shortly after the decision was
handed down, the Yale Law Journal published an anonymous
Note, which Bennett Boskey later attributed to Yale Law Professor
Harry Shulman, 23 s entitled Sawing a Justice in Half.2 36 "Opinions
of the Supreme Court delivered in the last weeks of this Term,"
the author wrote, "exhibit a capacity in that Court for division suf-
ficient to confound prophets and critics of all schools - legalistic,
metaphysical, psychological and economic. But the division in
Coleman v. Miller, recorded June 5th, should astonish even a Yogi
magician." 2 3 7 After surveying the various possibilities, the author
concluded that
"[o]nly Justices McReynolds and Butler could properly refuse to consider the
question; for they voted for the petitioners on other grounds and therefore
could have found it unnecessary to pass upon additional reasons supporting
the same conclusion. Yet, failing to carry a majority on those grounds, they
were under some duty to see whether they could find a majority for their re-
sult on any of the other grounds urged." 238
The still-perplexed author was left with a series of questions:
"What really did happen? Did a Justice refuse to vote on this issue?
And if he did, was it because he could not make up his mind? Or is
it possible to saw a Justice vertically in half during a conference and
have him walk away whole?" 2 39
234 307 U.S. at 446-47.
235 Recollections of West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 81 St. John's L.
Rev. 755, 787 (2007).
236 48 Yale L.J. 1455 (1939).
237 Id. at 1455 (footnotes omitted).
238 Id. at 1458.
239 Id.
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In a conversation that took place more than half a century later,
Boskey related that:
"I later found out through Felix Frankfurter what had really happened in that
case. Justice McReynolds, who was a very ornery Justice, used to go off a lit-
tle bit early before the end of the Term on vacation. And in this particular
case, the point involved was a new point that came up after Justice McRey-
nolds had gone off on vacation. And nobody was going to try and call him
back-he would have told them, frankly,'Go to hell.' He wouldn't have come
back. So Hughes just said,'On this issue, the Court is evenly divided.'"
240
It seems that McReynolds was indeed absent from the final
meeting during which the justices met to deliberate on the case.
Coleman was delivered on the final opinion day of the term, June 5,
1939. On May 30, Chief Justice Hughes wrote to his colleagues that
"[flour opinions have been circulated" in Coleman - Hughes's,
Black's, Frankfurter's, and Butler's - "and, in view of the shortness
of time, it seems to me desirable that we should have a conference
as soon as possible in order to determine whether an opinion can
be written for the Court and, if so, what it shall decide. Accordingly,
I ask that the brethren meet in conference tomorrow, Wednesday,
at noon." 24 1 We know that McReynolds was absent from the
Court's final session on June 5,242 and the docket books of his col-
leagues reveal that he also did not attend the Court's final confer-
ence on June 3.243 On June 16, McReynolds's clerk for that Term
240 81 St. John's L. Rev. at 787.
241 See, e.g., Hughes to Black, May 30, 1939, Box 256, Hugo L. Black MSS, Manu-
script Division, Library of Congress; Hughes to Douglas, May 30, 1939, Box 36,
William 0. Douglas MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
242 See Hague v. C.I.0, 307 U.S. 496, 500 (1939) ("Mr. Justice Butler, presiding in
the absence of the Chief Justice and Justice McReynolds"). Hughes was absent due
to illness with a duodenal ulcer. See 2 Members Away, High Court Plans to Finish
Term, Wash. Post, June 5, 1939, p. 2.
243 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book at 556 lists McReynolds as "abs[ent]" for the vote
on the petition for rehearing in No. 945, City & County of Denver v. The People of
the State of Colorado, while listing everyone else as voting to dismiss. Douglas
Docket OT 1938 Book at 303 similarly lists no vote for McReynolds and a vote to dis-
miss for everyone else. Douglas OT Docket Book at 304, Stone OT 1938 Docket
Book at 557, and Butler OT 1938 Docket Book at 608 also list no vote for McRey-
nolds and a vote to dismiss for everyone else in No. 975, The Kansas Farmers' Union
Royalty Co. v. Hushaw. With respect to petitions for certiorari, Douglas OT 1938
Docket Book records votes for everyone but McReynolds in No. 926, Partridge v.
Martin, and No. 948 Townshend v. Union Trust Co. of Maryland. In none of the
cases taken up at the June 3 conference is there any indication of a vote cast by
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wrote to his mother that "[t]he Justice returned to Washington
after having been away for two weeks visiting his old home in Ken-
tucky." 24 4 This action, though hardly commendable, may not have
been quite as irresponsible as Boskey's account suggests. The Court
had announced on May 1 that it would adjourn for the summer on
May 29,245 and McReynolds, who was traveling to his birthplace for
McReynolds at that conference. See Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Stone 1938 OT
Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1938 Docket Book. For the
conference list, see Box 36, William 0. Douglas MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress. On June 4, with a dateline of June 3, the Times-Picayune reported that
McReynolds "already has left Washington to visit relatives in Kentucky." Hughes
Stricken Ill; Will Be Off Bench for Time, Times-Picayune, June 4, 1939, p. 25.
244 Milton Musser to Ellis Shipp Musser, June 16, 1939, Box 21, folder 4, Musser
Family Papers, Utah State Archives. Musser continued, "I hope he leaves again and
soon." Id.
245 Supreme Court to Quit May 29 for Summer, Wash. Post, May 2, 1939, p. 2
("The Supreme Court announced yesterday that it will adjourn for the summer on
May 29, barring unexpected developments"). It appears that the six week absence
(March 4-April 15) of the Chief Justice owing to illness, compounded by the two
month hiatus (February 13-April 17) between the resignation of Brandeis and the
confirmation of Douglas, put the Court a bit behind in its work. Though the justices
handed down thirteen decisions on February 27, see 306 U.S. at 240-397, they de-
livered only one more over the next month (Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939),
March 13). The Court handed down ten more decisions on March 27, see 306 U.S.
at 436-521, but only two more on April 3, see 306 U.S. at 522-530. When the Court
was restored to full strength on April 17, the justices announced twenty-one more
decisions. See 306 U.S. at 531-614, 307 U.S. at 1-160. The Court announced one
more decision on April 24, see 307 U.S. at 161-70, six more on May 15, see 307 U.S.
at 171-218, and eight more on May 22, see 307 U.S. at 219-313. But despite hand-
ing down six more decisions on May 29, see 307 U.S. at 313-432, there remained
seven more that had yet to be rendered. These included not only Coleman and its
companion case from Kentucky, Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 414 (1939), but also
such other major cases generating multiple opinions as Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496
(1939), U.S. v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939), and H.P. Hood &
Sons v. United States, 307 U.S. 588 (1939). Justice Douglas's files show that he was
at work on an opinion concurring in the result of American Toll Bridge Co. v. Railroad
Commission of California, 307 U.S. 486 (1939), every day from May 29 to June 2.
See Box 37, William 0. Douglas MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
Douglas eventually scrapped the opinion and simply noted his concurrence in the
result. 307 U.S. at 496. The Court heard argument in twenty cases during Hughes's
absence in March, see 306 U.S. at 466-601; in late April and early May, after Hughes
had returned and Douglas had joined the Court, the justices heard argument or
re-argument in seventeen cases. These included Coleman, Chandler, Rock Royal,
Hood, O'Malley v Woodrough, Graves v. Elliott, and United States v. Powers. See
307 U.S. at 171-588. Rock Royal and Hood were not argued until April 24-26, see
307 U.S. at 533, 588, and were not discussed in conference until May 6. See Confer-
ence List, May 6, 1939, Box 36 William 0. Douglas MSS, Manuscript Division, Library
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"a family reunion and celebration," 2 4 6 appears to have relied upon
that announcement in making his plans. The clerk's letter does not
supply specific dates of travel, but the Washington Post reported
on June 12 that McReynolds had left his boyhood home in Elkton
the preceding day in order to attend the funeral of Judge Charles H.
Robb on Tuesday, June 13.247 An absence of two weeks would place
McReynolds's departure from Washington on May 30 or May 31.
On June 2, 1939, the Paducah Sun-Democrat ran a story with the
headline "Justice McReynolds Picks Elkton Visit over Fete for King."
With a dateline from Elkton on June 2, the story related that
McReynolds had declined an invitation to meet the King and
Queen of Great Britain at a June 8 garden party held at the British
embassy in Washington "because," as he told his interviewer in Elk-
ton, "I simply preferred to be here." 24 8
This evidence alone would suggest that McReynolds probably
had left Washington by the time that the justices convened on
May 31. The journey from Washington to Elkton is one of approxi-
mately 725 miles. McReynolds allocated two days for his return
trip from Elkton to Washington for Judge Robb's funeral, so he
probably would have allocated the same amount of time for his
transit from Washington to Elkton. Whether he traveled by car24 9
of Congress. Indeed, the justices needed another conference on June 3 in order to
dispose of some remaining matters. See Conference List, June 3, 1939, Box 36, Wil-
liam 0. Douglas MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Justice Douglas's pa-
pers contain a document, apparently prepared some time before March 27, 1939,
with the heading "Proposed Schedule for Remainder of October Term, 1938." The
schedule anticipates Argument days on March 27, April 17, and April 24; Recess on
April 3, April 10, and May 8; and Court Sessions on May 1, May 15, May 22, and
May 29. Box 36, William 0. Douglas MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
Both the Proposed Schedule and the May 1 announcement of the Court's remaining
calendar appear in retrospect to have been overly optimistic.
246 Justice McReynolds "Snubs" Royalty for Reunion, Chicago Daily Tribune, June
6, 1939, p. 9.
247 McReynolds Coming Here, Wash. Post, June 12, 1939, p. 17.
248 Justice McReynolds Picks Elkton Visit Over Fete for King, Paducah Sun-
Democrat, June 2, 1939, p. 5. See also Justice McReynolds "Snubs" Royalty for Reun-
ion, Chicago Daily Tribune, June 6, 1939, p. 9.
249 McReynolds liked to travel in his 1929 six-cylinder Buick couple convertible,
and may well have journeyed by car to Elkton that year. Though he was reportedly
an aggressively fast driver, he would not have covered the distance from Washing-
ton to Elkton on the roads of 1939 in a single day. On a 1936 drive from Washington
to West Point - a journey of under 300 miles - McReynolds allocated two days for
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or by train, 2 5 0 if McReynolds was in Elkton early enough on June
2nd to grant an interview that would be published in Paducah's
evening newspaper, then he probably would have departed Wash-
ington no later than May 31.
Any remaining doubt about McReynolds's presence at the May
31 conference is removed, however, by the June 3 dateline edition
of Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen's Washington Merry-Go-
Round column. There - two days before the even division in Cole-
man was announced - the authors reported that that McReynolds
would not be present with his hardworking colleagues for the
Court's June 5th session because he would be "taking things easy"
in Elkton. "The Court originally had fixed its adjournment date for
May 29," Pearson and Allen noted, but "under the pressure of an
extra heavy docket, Chief Justice Hughes added another week to
the term in order to clean up unfinished cases. Meanwhile McRey-
nolds had arranged a reunion in Elkton and refused to change his
plans notwithstanding the uncompleted calendar. He sat with the
court on May 29, but the next day packed his bag and started on his
vacation while his colleagues remained at their desks." 251
It appears clear, therefore, that McReynolds was in fact the miss-
ing justice in Coleman. However, because the question of whether
the Lieutenant Governor was eligible to vote had been briefed and
argued by the parties, 252 and because the original draft of Hughes's
opinion had contained over five pages of text deciding the issue on
the merits in favor of the officer's eligibility,25 3 it is hard to under-
stand how that could have been "a new point that came up" so late
transit, stopping for the first night at Delaware Water Gap, approximately 240 miles
from Washington. See Hutchinson & Garrow at 23-27.
250 As of 1947 the trip from Washington to Cincinnati on the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad was one of 11.5 hours. http://www.american-rails.com/cincinnatian.html.
The connecting train on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad to Guthrie, Kentucky -
which might have required an overnight stay in Cincinnati - would as of 1958 still
have consumed another 6.5 hours. http://www.Inrr.org/Magazine/Lnpassenger
timetable.pdf. McReynolds would then have faced a ten-mile journey to Elkton on
the Guthrie & Elkton Railroad, or possibly transportation by automobile.
251 Drew Pearson & Robert S. Allen, McReynolds Jumps Gun on Court Associates
by Taking Vacation Early, Nashville Tennessean, June 5, 1939, p. 5.
252 Brief on Behalf of Petitioner, Coleman v. Miller, at 5-13; Brief on Behalf of
Respondents, Coleman v. Miller, at 1-2, 4-6.
253 Chief Justice Hughes, draft opinion in Coleman v. Miller, Box 256, Hugo L.
Black MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, pp. 9-14.
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in the deliberations. More likely, it seems, is that the precise issue
of whether the Lieutenant Governor's eligibility to vote presented
a non-justiciable political question, which the parties did not brief
or argue, was "a new point" raised by one of the justices late in the
production of the opinions.
That justice appears to have been Black, who wrote in the mar-
gin of his copy of Hughes's draft that the issue of the Lieutenant
Governor's eligibility presented "a political question for Con-
gress," 25 4 and scribbled "by Congress though" next to Hughes's as-
sertion that the issue presented "a federal question to be
determined in deciding whether the 'legislature' has acted as re-
quired by Article V." 25 5 In his concurring opinion, which was joined
by Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas, Black asserted that
"whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional de-
termination of ratification conforms to the command of the Consti-
tution, calls for decisions by a 'political department' of questions of
a type which this Court has frequently designated 'political."
256
Black went on to disapprove of "judicial review of or pronounce-
ments ... as to whether duly authorized state officials have pro-
ceeded properly in ratifying or voting for ratification" as "judicial
interference" in "matters that we believe were intrusted by the
Constitution solely to the political branch of government." 257 The
Amendment process, Black insisted, was "'political' in its entirety,
from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Consti-
tution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control, or interfer-
ence at any point." 2 58
Hughes's draft opinion made it clear that he disagreed with
Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas on the question of the jus-
ticiability of the issue of the Lieutenant Governor's eligibility, and it
appears that Stone and Reed agreed with him. Justice Butler's dis-
senting opinion closed by observing that the question of whether
the issue of the proposed amendment's vitality was non-justiciable
254 Id. at 9.
255 Id. at 10.
256 307 U.S. at 457 (emphasis added).
257 Id. at 458.
258 Id. at 459. These three passages also appear in an earlier, undated, uncircu-
lated draft of Black's separate opinion. Box 256, Hugo Black MSS, Manuscript Divi-
sion, Library of Congress.
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"was not raised by the parties or by the United States appearing as
amicus curiae." Neither had that question been suggested by the
Court when it ordered re-argument. It therefore would be inappro-
priate, Butler opined, "without hearing argument on the point," to
hold that the Court lacked power to decide the question of
whether the amendment was no longer subject to ratification.2 5 9
Though his opinion did not speak to the issue of the Lieutenant
Governor's eligibility, Butler may well have taken a similar view of
the claim that the Court should declare that issue non-justiciable
without appropriate briefing and argument. In any event, it ap-
pears that Butler joined Hughes, Stone, and Reed in opposing
those who supported Black's position, producing a 4-4 tie. It ap-
pears that McReynolds simply was not there to break the deadlock.
Even if McReynolds had been present, however, it is not certain
that he would have cast a vote on the issue. Douglas noted in his
docket book that, at the April 22nd conference, "McReynolds hav-
ing voted to dismiss did not vote on the merits." 2 60 As is suggested
by the Yale Law Journal Note, which affirmed that McReynolds
"could properly refuse to consider the question," it may be that the
irascible justice, who had declined to vote on the merits in confer-
ence, would have simply refused to vote on this issue. He ulti-
mately backed his friend Butler on the question of the proposed
amendment's vitality, and for this it was necessary that he change
his conference position - probably quite reluctantly, in light of
what we know of his jurisdictional views 2 6 1 - on the threshold
question of standing. 2 6 2 But having thus disposed of the merits on
259 Id. at 474.
260 Douglas OT 1938 Docket Book.
261 See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 299, 317 (Brandeis opining that "McR. cares more about jurisdictional re-
straints than any of them").
262 The fact that Hughes's opinion was identified as "the opinion of the Court"
might suggest that McReynolds and Butler actually joined the portion of Hughes's
opinion addressing the standing issue. As Hughes's May 30 letter expressed some
doubt about whether "an opinion can be written for the Court," this might appear
to suggest that McReynolds was present for the May 31 conference, and that he
and Butler agreed to join the portion of Hughes's opinion addressing the standing
question. However, Hughes also purported to write "the opinion of the Court" on
the issue of the proposed amendment's continuing vitality, but Butler and McRey-
nolds dissented from this holding, and Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas con-
curred "in the result reached, but for somewhat different reasons." 307 U.S. at 457.
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the ground that the proposed amendment was no longer subject
to ratification, he might not have thought it necessary or proper to
reach the issue of the Lieutenant Governor's eligibility to vote.
Indeed, the fact that Butler's dissenting opinion did not speak to
the issue of the Kansas legislature's previous rejection of the pro-
posed amendment may have been a concession made to conciliate
McReynolds. If McReynolds would have persisted in his refusal to
reach the other merits issues, it may not have mattered that he
failed to attend the May 31 conference on Coleman.
Thornhill v. Alabama 26 3 was one of several civil rights and civil lib-
erties cases in which one or more of the justices changed position
between the conference vote and the final vote on the merits. In
Thornhill, the Court's holding that peaceful labor picketing was pro-
tected free speech was unanimous, but at the conference McRey-
nolds had passed.264 In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 26 5 an
8-1 majority upheld a state regulation requiring students in public
schools to participate in a daily ceremony involving recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance while saluting the flag. At the conference,
seven of the justices had voted to sustain the measure, but Stone
and Black had passed.26 6 The two justices ultimately resolved their
This meant that there were seven votes in favor of the disposition, but only three -
Hughes, Stone, and Reed - for what purported to be the "opinion of the Court" on
that issue. It therefore appears that, at least with respect to the issue of the pro-
posed amendment's continued vitality, the reported decision does not use the term
"the opinion of the Court" in its current sense, but only to indicate that there was a
majority for the result reached if not for the rationale articulated by Hughes's opin-
ion. It may be that Hughes similarly regarded his opinion as "the opinion of the
Court" with respect to the disposition of the standing issue, if not with respect to
its analysis. It is also possible that Hughes and/or his colleagues may have consid-
ered the portion of the opinion dealing with the standing issue as "the opinion of
the Court," in the sense that there were five justices who had not affirmatively indi-
cated that they disagreed with its result or reasoning. For a recent effort to untangle
the votes in and thus to determine the meaning of Coleman, see Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Districting Comm'n, (Scalia, J., dissenting), Slip
Opinion at 4-6 (2015).
263 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
264 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Reed OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939
Docket Book.
265 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
266 Stone OT 1939 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1939 Docket Book. Reed OT 1939
Docket Book contains no record of the conference vote. Murphy's conference notes
record Hughes as speaking in favor of the regulation, though with some reserva-
tions. Dickson at 430-31.
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respective uncertainties in different ways: Black joined the major-
ity, while Stone filed a lone dissent. 2 67 And in Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 268 the Court held that the state's system of segregated
legal education violated the Equal Protection Clause. The published
decision was by a vote of 6-2, with McReynolds and Butler dissent-
ing. 2 6 9 At the conference, however, Butler had been with the major-
ity.2 70 The notes of Stone and Brandeis are difficult to decipher, but
from Brandeis's entry it appears that Butler, Stone, and Black may
have expressed a preference for some sort of "mollification." 27 1 In
any event, Butler apparently was not satisfied by the opinion
agreed upon by the other members of the conference majority,
and he defected to the dissent.
The domain of criminal procedure was the site of one of the
most dramatic post-conference shifts in voting. In Johnson v.
Zerbst, 2 72 the Court held that that the Sixth Amendment required
that the Government provide counsel to federal criminal defen-
dants who were unable to secure representation. The final decision
was 6-2: Reed concurred in the judgment of reversal, McReynolds
and Butler dissented, and Cardozo did not participate. At the con-
ference, however, seven of the eight justices present had voted to
affirm, with Stone passing.273 The votes of six justices changed be-
tween the conference and announcement of the decision. The
change was far more modest in Nordone v United States,2 7 4 where
267 McReynolds concurred in the result.
28 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
269 Cardozo had died and had not yet been replaced by Frankfurter.
270 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1938
Docket Book. Butler OT 1938 Docket Book and Reed OT 1938 Docket Book contain
no record of the conference vote.
271 Brandeis OT 1938 Docket Book. Stone's notes indicate that Hughes invoked
the authority of the "McCabe Case." The reference here is to McCabe v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914), in which Hughes wrote the
opinion of the court holding that an Oklahoma statute that permitted rail carriers
to provide sleeping and dining cars only to whites violated the Equal Protection
Clause, even if there were limited demand for such accommodations by African-
Americans.
272 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
273 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Reed OT 1937 Docket Book. Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book contains
no record of the conference vote.
274 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
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the Court upheld the suppression of evidence obtained through an
illegal wiretap.The final vote was 7-2, with McReynolds and Suther-
land dissenting, but at the conference vote Cardozo passed. 27 5
Two major voting rights cases also involved interesting changes
of position between conference and final decision. In Lane v.
Wilson, 27 6 the Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute that was de-
signed to preserve the scheme of African-American disfranchise-
ment that the Court had invalidated in Guinn v. United States. 27 7 In
Guinn, a unanimous Court had invalidated the Oklahoma constitu-
tion's "grandfather clause," which exempted from the state's liter-
acy test for the suffrage those descended from persons qualified to
vote before 1866. The clause was a transparent attempt to deny
the right to vote on the basis of race, and the Court struck it down
as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. A special session of the
Oklahoma legislature responded by enacting a statute requiring
that persons who were eligible to vote but for the grandfather
clause had to register to vote within a twelve day window in 1916
or be forever disfranchised. Lane was among those otherwise eligi-
ble, but for reasons that were disputed he was not registered dur-
ing the 1916 window. When the county registrars refused to enroll
him in 1934, he claimed that this deprived him of rights secured by
the Fifteenth Amendment. 2 78
The final vote in Lane was 6-2, with McReynolds and Butler dis-
senting. At the conference, however, both Stone and Butler record
Hughes as voting with the dissenters. 2 7 9 Indeed, though Butler's
notes of the conference are difficult to decipher, it appears that
Hughes embraced the state's theory of the case completely. Butler
records Hughes as invoking the authority of the "Giles Case," 2 8 0 i.e.,
275 Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Butler OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book; Brandeis OT 1937 Docket Book. Brandeis has an illegible notation in
Cardozo's voting column.
276 307 U.S. 268 (1939). Douglas took no part in the decision.
277 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
278 307 U.S. at 269-72.
279 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938 Docket Book. Roberts OT 1938
Docket Book contains no record of the conference vote. Butler records Reed as vot-
ing both to affirm and to reverse. Reed OT 1938 Docket Book records the vote as 6-
1 to affirm, with Butler alone in dissent and Hughes not voting. At the same time,
however, he records the disposition as "Reversed."
280 Butler OT 1938 Docket Book.
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Giles v. Harris, 281 which the majority opinion expressly held was not
controlling.282 Hughes argued that the plaintiff "Can't recover be-
cause he didn't pursue stat to [illegible]." 28 3 By this he presumably
meant, as Frankfurter summarized the argument in his majority
opinion, "that the state procedure for determining claims of dis-
crimination must be employed before invoking a federal judi-
ciary." 2 84 But here again the Court concluded that "[t]o vindicate
his present grievance the plaintiff did not have to pursue whatever
remedy may have been open to him in the state courts." 285 Finally,
Hughes appears to have found the statute in question unproble-
matic because it was facially neutral. Butler records him as stating
that it was "applicable to negroes and whites alike."286 Here again,
the opinion that Hughes ultimately joined rejected this argu-
ment. 28 7 The Chief Justice appears to have acquiesced in the major-
ity's judgments on each of the three principal issues presented by
the case.
Finally, United States v. Classic,288 a case handed down in the wan-
ing days of Hughes's tenure, upheld the convictions of Louisiana
Commissioners of Elections under the Enforcement Act of 1870 for
fraudulently tabulating the results of a Democratic primary election
for Congress. At the conference, Black passed, and Hughes did not
participate. All of the other justices voted to reverse. 28 9 But between
281 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (denying relief to African-Americans seeking an order re-
quiring voting registrars in Montgomery, Alabama to enroll their names on the vot-
ing lists of the county).
282 307 U.S. at 267-69.
283 Butler OT 1938 Docket Book.
284 307 U.S. at 272.
285 307 U.S. at 274.
286 Butler OT 1938 Docket Book.
287 307 U.S. at 275-77.
288 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Hughes took no part in the decision.
289 Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book; Douglas OT 1940 Docket Book. Reed OT 1940
Docket Book contains no record of the conference vote. Hughes stated at the outset
of the discussion that, "As I was counsel in the Newberry case [Newberry v. United
States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), holding that Congress had no power to regulate pri-
mary elections], I prefer to have it started by Justice Stone." Dickson at 834. Murphy
wrote in his entry that Hughes "did not vote." Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book re-
cords Hughes and Black as not voting, and everyone else voting to reverse. He has a
mark in the reverse column for Hughes, but it appears to be a crossed-out vote.
Stone OT 1940 Docket Book records the vote as unanimous, with both Hughes and
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the conference and the final decision, Black resolved his doubts in
favor of dissent, and Douglas and Murphy defected from the confer-
ence majority to join him on the grounds that the statute under
which the defendants had been convicted did not apply to primary
elections.2 90 A case that at conference seemed likely to produce una-
nimity was thus decided by the narrow margin of 4-3.
3. REASSIGNMENTS
After Justice Willis Van Devanter's retirement at the end of the
1936 Term, the number of reassignments per Term remained rather
small. What few transfers there were often resulted from a mid-Term
retirement, a recusal, a post-conference voting shift altering the
case's outcome, or a disagreement over rationale. During the 1937
Term, Roberts took two tax cases from Cardozo, 291 and also relieved
Black of a controversy over federal jurisdiction. 29 2 In addition, Bran-
deis took from Roberts a case in which the latter justice ultimately
did not participate. 29 3 The following year, McReynolds took two cases
from Frankfurter,29 4 and Stone took two more from the retiring
Black voting, but records no vote for himself. The Murphy and Roberts accounts cor-
roborate Douglas's notes of the conference. See David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt
Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v.
Classic, 90 Yale L.J. 741, 797 (1981). On the return of Stone's first circulated draft,
Hughes wrote, "I think I should not take part." On the second he wrote, "Please
note that I took no part." Chief Justice Hughes, Returns of United States v. Classic,
Box 66, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
290 Bixby at 799-803.
291 No. 48, U.S. v. Andrews, and No. 262, U.S. v. Garbutt Oil Co. Butler OT 1937
Docket Book; Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937 Docket Book; Brandeis
OT 1937 Docket Book.
292 No. 274, St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co. Butler OT 1937 Docket
Book; Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937 Docket Book; Brandeis OT
1937 Docket Book.
293 No. 33, Helvering v. Bashford. Stone OT 1937 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1937
Docket Book. The initial conference vote was 5-4 to affirm, with Roberts, Hughes,
McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler in the majority, and Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo,
and Black dissenting. Roberts later recused himself, and on a second vote Hughes
shifted camps to join the former dissenters, while Cardozo was absent.The ultimate
disposition was 5-3 for reversal, with McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler dissent-
ing, and the ailing Cardozo taking no part. 302 U.S. 454 (1938).
294 No. 65, Fairbanks v. U.S., and No. 548, Smith v. The Ferncliff. Butler OT 1938
Docket Book; Stone OT 1938 Docket Book.
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Brandeis.295 Stone also assumed responsibility for two cases previously
assigned to colleagues who ended up dissenting. 296 No. 509, Driscoll v
Edison Light & Power Co., appears initially to have been assigned to
Frankfurter,29 7 but was ultimately written by Reed, with the former
professor instead writing a concurring opinion objecting to the major-
ity's rationale.2 98 And when the Court initially voted in October of
1938 to reverse the lower court in No. 14, Chandler v. Wise, the opin-
ion had been assigned to Brandeis. 299 The case was reargued in the
spring of 1939 after Brandeis had retired, however, and Hughes ulti-
mately wrote the opinion dismissing rather than reversing the case.3c
The 1939 Term recorded only three reassignments: one from
Reed to Douglas,30 one from Frankfurter to Douglas, 302 and one
from Murphy to Hughes. 3 03 And during Hughes's final Term as Chief
Justice, only five cases changed hands. Murphy took one case from
Hughes, 304 and he relieved Stone of another in which the latter ulti-
mately took no part.30 5 Stone reciprocated by taking a case from
295 No. 158, Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of
California, Butler OT 1938 Docket Book; Stone OT 1938 Docket Book; Nos. 252-256,
Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book.
296 No. 339, Curry v. McCanless, initially was assigned to Butler, who ultimately
dissented with Hughes, McReynolds, and Roberts. Stone OT 1938 Docket Book. No.
372, Graves v. Elliott, initially was assigned to Hughes, who ultimately wrote a dis-
sent joined by McReynolds, Butler, and Roberts. Stone OT 1938 Docket Book. The
conference vote on January 14, 1939 was 4-3, with the eventual dissenters compris-
ing the majority. Cardozo had not yet been replaced by Frankfurter, and Brandeis,
who would soon retire, did not vote. Roberts OT 1938 Docket Book; Butler OT 1938
Docket Book; Stone OT 1938 Docket Book. The case was reargued in late April, after
both Frankfurter and Douglas had been confirmed, and the votes of the new jus-
tices changed the outcome. 307 U.S. 383 (1939).
297 Butler OT 1938 Docket Book.
298 307 U.S. 104, 122 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
299 Stone OT 1938 Docket Book.
30 307 U.S. 474 (1939). Douglas OT 1938 Docket Book has no record of
reassignments.
301 No. 386, Dickinson Industrial Site, Inc. v. Cowan. Stone OT 1939 Docket Book;
Murphy OT 1939 Docket Book. Douglas's clerk records that "his concurring opinion
became opin. of Court." Douglas 0T 1939 Docket Book.
302 No. 384, Helvering v. Wood. Stone OT 1939 Docket Book.
303 No. 559, Helvering v. Price. Stone OT 1939 Docket Book.
304 No. 74, Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co. Stone OT 1940 Docket Book.
305 No. 90, Benitez Sampayo v. Bank of Nova Scotia. Roberts OT 1940 Docket
Book.
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Murphy.306 Finally, Stone also took control of two cases that initially
had been assigned to McReynolds,307 but from which the latter ulti-
mately dissented along with Hughes and Roberts.30
4. CONCLUSION
In addition to the information that they provide about the Court's
deliberations in particular cases, the docket books of the late Hughes
Court justices teach us some larger lessons. First, the docket books
show that the few instances in which Hughes reassigned cases typi-
cally involved a mid-term retirement, a recusal, a post-conference
voting shift, or a disagreement over rationale. Second, they also illu-
minate the civil liberties views of Hughes and Cardozo. Cardozo pub-
licly dissented from a number of decisions reversing criminal
convictions,30 but his passing conference vote in Nardone v. United
306 No. 727, Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets. Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book.
307 The first case was No. 27, Helvering v. Horst. Stone OT 1940 Docket Book;
Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book. The vote at the October 29, 1940 conference had
been 7-2 to affirm, with Black and Douglas dissenting. Stone OT 1940 Docket Book;
Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book. Roberts records, a
"Revote" on November 15, in which Stone, Reed, and Frankfurter changed their
votes, and Murphy passed. Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; see also Stone 1940 OT
Docket Book. Murphy ultimately joined the new majority for dismissal. 311 U.S. 112
(1940). The second case was No.205, Helvering v. Eubank, in which a similar voting
pattern was observed. Stone OT 1940 Docket Book; Murphy OT 1940 Docket Book;
Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book. The vote at the October 29 conference was 5-4 to af-
firm, with Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy dissenting. A "Revote" was held
on November 15, where Black and Stone changed their votes to reverse. Stone re-
cords Murphy as again passing, while Roberts records him as holding to his original
vote to reverse. Roberts OT 1940 Docket Book; Stone OT 1940 Docket Book. In ei-
ther event, Murphy ultimately joined the majority to reverse. 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
Douglas OT 1940 Docket Book records that in these two cases "Dissenting opinion
by Stone, J. became opinion of Court."
3os Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 125 (1940) (McReynolds, J., dissenting);
Helvering v. Horst 311 U.S. 112, 120 (1940) (McReynolds, J. dissenting).
30 See, e.g., Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 212 (1932) (Stone and Cardozo
dissent from opinion holding search unconstitutional); Grau v. United States, 287
U.S. 124, 129 (1932) (Stone and Cardozo dissent from opinion holding search un-
constitutional); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (Cardozo writes
and Stone joins opinion holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to
state criminal prosecutions); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 398 (1933)
(Stone and Cardozo dissent from opinion affirming that it was reversible error for
the trial judge to inform the jury of his view that the accused was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt).
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States suggests that he was even less favorably inclined toward
claims of the accused than his published vote would appear to indi-
cate. And assuming that Butler's notes on the conference discussion
in Lane v. Wilson faithfully record the Chief Justice's remarks, Hughes
was less inclined to strong protections of voting rights than his vote
in the published opinion would suggest. His passing vote at the Can-
twell v. Connecticut conference and his dissenting conference vote
in Lanzetta v. New Jersey similarly complicate his civil liberties record
as reflected in the U.S. Reports.
The published decisions are not nearly as misleading concerning
the civil rights and civil liberties views of Cardozo and Hughes, how-
ever, as they are of those of McReynolds. Though he ultimately
joined majorities favoring such claims in many cases, at conference
he dissented from dispositions that he would publicly join in Cham-
bers v. Florida, Lanzetta v. NewlJersey, and Pierre v. Louisiana. In ad-
dition, at conference he passed in Thornhill v. Alabama, Lovell v.
Griffin, Weiss v. United States, and Smith v. Texas. Indeed, it seems
that late in his tenure, as the personnel of the Court changed and
he became increasingly isolated in his views, the aging and, as one
of his clerks charged, lazy310 Justice may not have been preparing
for conference as assiduously as he might have. He seemed to pass
more frequently at conference votes, and as he remarked when his
turn came to speak at the Consolidated Edison conference in 1939,
he had "nothing to say."
The docket books also reveal considerable fluidity between the
initial conference vote and the final vote on the merits among the
justices of the late Hughes Court. First, there were eight instances
of defection in major cases. McReynolds was responsible for 37.5%
of these, departing from passing conference votes in Erie, Moun-
tain Producers, and on the issue of the timeliness of ratification in
Coleman. Five other justices contributed one defection (12.5%)
each. Butler departed from a vote with the conference majority in
Gaines, as did Douglas and Murphy in Classic. Meanwhile, Stone
and Black abandoned passing conference votes in favor of pub-
lished dissents in Gobitis and Classic, respectively. Thus, three
(37.5%) of these defections were of the strong variety, and five
(62.5%) of the weak variety. Second, there were instances of
310 See Hutchinson & Garrow at 141-42, 189-92, 227.
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post-conference shifts that created majorities for a disposition for
which none had materialized at conference. Stone ultimately
broke a 4-4 conference deadlock in Rock Royal, while in Zerbst six
justices changed positions between the conference vote and the
final vote on the merits to transform a conference majority to af-
firm into a decision to reverse. Third, there was an instance of jus-
tices switching places between the 5-4 vote at the conference and
the 5-4 final vote on the merits that did not alter the Court's dis-
position of the relevant issue. It is difficult to know whether
McReynolds was acquiescing or defecting on the standing issue in
Coleman, because we do not know whether he changed his vote
before or after Roberts defected from the conference majority on
that issue. But though this trading of places changed the composi-
tion of the narrow majority, it did not alter the judgment. Fourth,
there were instances in which a focus on the conference vote is
not sufficiently nuanced to capture the texture of a case of acqui-
escence adequately. To be sure, Black and Reed changed their
conference votes concerning the disposition in Erie, but their con-
ference remarks indicate that they subscribed to much of the
broader rationale on which Brandeis's opinion ultimately rested.
Similarly, Black and perhaps Douglas and Stone did not persuade
their colleagues to overrule both Miles v. Graham and Evans v.
Gore in O'Malley, and they ultimately joined an opinion overruling
only the former case. But this acquiescence in rationale did not re-
quire any change in their conference votes regarding the case's
disposition.
The most common form of vote fluidity on the late Hughes
Court, however, was acquiescence. The thirty-four unanimous deci-
sions discussed here provide a rough indication of this: while
sixteen (47.1%) of these cases also were unanimous at conference,
eighteen (52.9%) were not. If we eliminate from this category
unanimous cases decided per curiam and without full opinion, the
respective percentages become even more striking. Of the thirty
unanimous cases decided by full opinion, twelve (40%) also were
unanimous at conference, while eighteen (60%) were not.3 11 This
311 If we also eliminate Hale v. Kentucky, which was decided per curiam with a full
opinion, the respective percentages become 37.9% and 62.1%.
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observation is consistent with earlier studies finding that
conformity voting is the most common form of vote fluidity.3 1 2
The frequency with which each of the justices acquiesced in the
views of the majority is worthy of note. The notoriously cantanker-
ous and disagreeable Justice McReynolds was actually the member
of the Court most likely to acquiesce in a decision in order to pro-
duce unanimity. Of the eighteen unanimous decisions discussed
here that were not unanimous at conference, McReynolds acqui-
esced in thirteen (72.2%). By contrast, Hughes acquiesced in seven
(38.9%), Butler and Roberts in four (22.2%) each, and Brandeis and
Stone in one (5.6%) each. Of the Roosevelt appointees, only the
courtly Stanley Reed, who acquiesced in two decisions (10.1%),
suppressed his dissenting conference votes to produce unanimity
in any of these cases. Of these thirty-two instances of acquies-
cence, twenty (62.5%) were of the strong variety and twelve
(37.5%) were of the weak variety.3 13
Acquiescence in non-unanimous cases was, understandably, less
common. Hughes, Stone, and Roberts each did so twice (20%), and
McReynolds, Butler, Cardozo, and Black once (10%) each. Of these
312 See, e.g., Maltzman & Wahlbeck, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 590-91 (finding that
justices were more likely to move from a dissenting conference vote to the majority
than to defect from the conference majority); Brenner & Dorff, 4 J.Theoretical Poli-
tics at 198 (finding that movement from conference minority to ultimate majority is
the most frequent type of vote fluidity); Brenner, 26 Am. J. Pol. Sci. at 389 (finding
that 68% of the cases in which there was vote fluidity resulted in an increase in the
size of the majority); Brenner, 24 Am. J. Pol. Sci. at 531, 534 ("justices are more likely
to switch from the minority or nonparticipation at the original vote to the majority
position at the final vote than to shift in the opposite direction ... . Clearly, some of
the justices, once they have lost at the original vote or failed to participate in that
vote, are willing to conform to the opinion of the court's majority and vote with
them at the final vote. Indeed, over three-quarters of the vote changes moved in a
consensus direction").
313 Six of McReynolds's thirteen acquiescences in ultimately unanimous cases
were strong (Lowden, Waterman, Pierre, Lanzetta, Chambers, and Falcone), while
seven were weak (Alabama Power, Duke Power, Mackay Radio, Ford Motor, Weiss,
Smith v. Texas, and Lovell). Hughes acquiesced strongly in three unanimous deci-
sions (Lowden, Waterman, and Lanzetta), and weakly in four (Darby, Opp, Cantwell,
and Pullman). Each of Butler's four acquiescences in unanimous decisions was
strong (Mackay Radio, Ford Motor, Pierre, and Lovell). Roberts acquiesced strongly
in three unanimous cases (Lowden, Waterman, and Falcone), and weakly in one
(Pullman). Brandeis's acquiescence in Barnwell Bros. was strong, as was Stone's in
Lanzetta. Reed's acquiescences in both Chambers and Perkins were strong. It is also
possible, though not certain, that Frankfurter acquiesced in Falcone.
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ten instances of acquiescence, only three (30%) were of the strong
variety and seven (70%) were of the weak variety.314 Thus, of these
forty-two instances of acquiescence in major cases decided by the
late Hughes Court,315 twenty-three (54.8%) were of the strong vari-
ety and nineteen (45.2%) of the weak variety. An examination of
the breakdown of these instances of acquiescence reveals an inter-
esting and previously hidden irony found in the juxtaposition of the
public and private conduct of the justices. Those who were most
frequently found in the dissenting column in the Court's published
reports were also those who most often acquiesced in the judg-
ments of their colleagues in major cases. During the 1939 and 1940
Terms, the justices most like to dissent were McReynolds (22%),
Roberts (18%), and Hughes (12%).316 Of the forty-two instances of
acquiescence in major cases, by contrast, McReynolds, who served
for approximately three and a half of the four Terms, was alone re-
sponsible for 33.3%, recording fourteen in all. Hughes, who served
for the entire period, accounted for nine (21.4%). Roberts, who
served for the entire period, accounted for six instances (14.3%),
while Butler, who served for only two full Terms, accounted for five
(11.9%). Stone, who served for the entire period, accounted for
three (7.1%), while Reed, who served for approximately three and
a half of the Terms, accounted for two (4.8%). Brandeis, who served
for about one and a half of the Terms, and Cardozo, who did not sit
for any cases argued after December of 1937, each acquiesced in
one (2.4%) of these cases - the same number in which Black acqui-
esced over four full Terms. No instances of acquiescence in these
cases were recorded for Sutherland, who served for only a little
over three months of the 1937 Term; Douglas, who served a little
over two of the Terms; Murphy, who served for about one and a
314 Hughes acquiesced strongly in Lane and weakly in Gerhardt. Stone acquiesced
weakly in Brush and strongly on the merits issue in Coleman. Roberts acquiesced
weakly in Fainblatt and strongly on the merits issue in Coleman. The acquiescences
of McReynolds in Thornhill, Butler in Carolene Products, Cardozo in Nordone, and
Black in Gobitis were all of the weak variety.
315 For reasons explained above, I exclude from this number the voting shifts of
Black and Reed in Erie, the acquiescence in rationale by Black and perhaps by Stone
and Douglas in O'Malley, and McReynolds's shift with respect to the standing issue
in Coleman.
316 C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion among Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1939-1941, 35 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 890, 891 (1941).
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half of the Terms; and possibly Frankfurter, who served for approxi-
mately two and a half of the Terms. 317 The fact that McReynolds
was the late Hughes Court justice by far the most likely to acquiesce
in major decisions echoes Professor Saul Brenner's finding that on
the Vinson Court "extreme justices [were] most likely to be closer
to the mean at the final vote than at the original vote," because
"extreme justices are likely to lose more often at the original
vote." 3 18
317 Frankfurter may have acquiesced in Falcone, though the evidence from the
docket books is conflicting. See supro, n. 123.
318 Saul Brenner, Ideological Voting on the Vinson Court: A Comparison of Original
& Final Votes on the Merits, 22 Polity 157, 163 (1989). An examination of these
cases also provides some indication of the comparative success of the justices in
preparing opinions that would attract colleagues who had dissented or passed at
conference. There were eighteen major cases that became unanimous after a di-
vided conference vote. Of these, Stone (Barnwell Bros., Lowden, Darby, Falcone)
and Black (Waterman Steamship, Pierre, Smith v. Texas, Chambers v. Florida) each
wrote four (22.2%), Hughes (Ford Motor, Lovell, Perkins v. Elg) and Roberts (Mackay
Radio, Cantwell, Weiss) each wrote three (16.7%), Sutherland (Alabama Power,
Duke Power) wrote two (11.1%), and Butler (Lonzetta) and Frankfurter (Pullman)
each wrote one (5.6%). Neither Brandeis, Cardozo, Reed, nor Murphy was responsi-
ble for any of these decisions. This phenomenon can also be examined by looking at
the percentage of unanimous major opinions authored by a justice that were not
unanimous at conference. Here Sutherland (2/2), Roberts (3/3), Black (4/4), and
Frankfurter (1/1) all tied at 100%. Stone came next at 66.7% (4/6), while Hughes (3/
6) and Butler (1/2) each tied at 50%. The fraction for all other justices contained a
zero in either the numerator (McReynolds, Brandeis, Cardozo, Reed, Douglas, Mur-
phy) or the denominator (Brandeis, Cardozo, Murphy).
These data also should be viewed in light of divided major decisions in which the
author failed to increase the size of the conference majority. Excluding Hague, for
which there was no majority opinion, there were twenty-six such cases. Neither
McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Black, nor Murphy wrote any of these.
Hughes was the author of ten (38.5%) (Santa Cruz Fruit, Consolidated Edison, Fan-
steel, Currin, Electric Bond & Share, Bekins, Morgan II, Mountain Producers, Cole-
man, Gaines); Roberts wrote seven (26.9%) (Schneider, Sands, New Negro Alliance,
Lauf, Mulford, Tennessee Electric, Eisenberg); Stone wrote four (15.4%) (Columbian
Enameling, Apex Hosiery, Connecticut General, Classic); Reed wrote two (7.7%)
(Hood, Madden); and Cardozo (Palko), Frankfurter (Rowan & Nichols), and Douglas
(Sunshine Anthracite Coal) each wrote one (3.8%).
Finally, one should also consider cases in which the author of an opinion man-
aged to attract additional votes, but failed to achieve unanimity. Stone did so in
four of twelve such cases (Carolene Products, Gerhardt, O'Keefe, Fainblatt); Frank-
furter did so in three (O'Malley, Gobitis, Lane); and Brandeis (Erie), Sutherland
(Brush), Roberts (Nardone), Reed (Rock Royal), and Murphy (Thornhill) in one each.
Neither Hughes, McReynolds, Butler, Cardozo, Black, nor Douglas accounted for any
such cases.
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The fact that the most senior justices - McReynolds, Hughes,
Roberts, Butler, and Stone - were those who most frequently ac-
quiesced in the conference majority's judgment in major cases also
indicates that newcomers to the late Hughes Court did not experi-
ence the kind of freshman effect with respect to voting fluidity that
some scholars have found on other Courts. The late Hughes Court
welcomed five freshman justices: Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas,
and Murphy. As mentioned above, Reed acquiesced strongly in
Chambers and Perkins, and Black acquiesced weakly in Gobitis.
With the possible exception of Frankfurter, who may have acqui-
esced in Falcone, there were no other instances of acquiescence in
a major case by any of these freshman justices on the late Hughes
Court. 319
By contrast, the justices who remained from the early and mid-
dle years of the Hughes Court, many of whom were holdovers from
the Taft and/or White Courts, continued to aspire to the high rates
319 Further research will be necessary to determine whether the late Hughes
Court justices manifested greater degrees of vote fluidity or more of a freshman ef-
fect in nonsalient cases than are manifested in the cases examined here. Some stud-
ies of voting fluidity conclude that "justices were no more likely to change their
votes in important, or salient, cases than in those of lesser importance." Hagle &
Spaeth, 44 Western Political Quarterly at 124. See also Maltzman & Wahlbeck, 90
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 589 (finding that "justices are not less likely to switch in salient
cases"); Brenner, Hagle, & Spaeth, The Defection of the Marginal Justice, 42 Western
Political Quarterly 409 (concluding that the defection of the marginal member of
the minimum winning coalition on the Warren Court is best explained not by the
importance of the case, but instead by that justice's ideological proximity to mem-
bers of the dissenting coalition and, secondarily, to that justice's relative lack of
competence). Other studies conclude that acquiescence was in fact more likely to
occur in cases that were not "salient." Dorff & Brenner, 54 J. Politics at 772, 773;
Brenner, Hagle, & Spaeth, 23 Polity 309. Compare Brenner, 24 Am. J. Pol. Sci. at 530
(finding that percentage of total vote switches was no greater in "nonmajor" than
in "major" cases, but that vote switches occurred in a higher percentage of
"nonmajor" cases); Brenner, 26 AM. J. POL. SCL at 389 (reaching similar conclusions
with a different data set). Similarly, Paul Freund reported that, "As far as I could
make out, [Cardozo's] disagreements [with the majority in conference] - this being
his first full term on the Court - derived from the fact that in New York he had been
accustomed to a rather different set of procedural rules and substantive rules inter-
meshed with procedure, so that some things which were decided one way in the
federal courts would have been decided differently in New York," and that this is
what may have accounted for the Justice's allegedly frequent changes of vote be-
tween the conference and the final vote on the merits. Freund, 26 Ohio St. L. J. at
227. This suggests the possibility that in some instances a greater degree of fresh-
man vote fluidity might be exhibited in less salient cases.
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of unanimity that their predecessors had achieved. Taft is famous
for his "consuming ambition" to "mass the Court" - to build una-
nimity so as to give "weight and solidity" to its decisions.3 2 0 The
Taft Court achieved unanimity in a remarkable percentage of its
cases. For the 1921-1928 Terms, 84% of the Court's published
opinions were unanimous; 32 1 taking into account all of its decisions
for the entirety of Taft's tenure, the unanimity rate was 91.4%.322
This rate of unanimity was in line with the rates achieved by the
White Court, on which McReynolds, Brandeis, and Hughes each
had served,32 3 and the attitudes formed under White and his pre-
decessors appear to have contributed to the persistence of this
phenomenon. Taft discouraged dissents, believing that most of
them were displays of egotism that weakened the Court's prestige
and contributed little of value. 32 4 As a consequence, he worked
hard to minimize disagreement, often sacrificing the expression of
his own personal views.325 Van Devanter shared Taft's distaste for
public displays of discord, and strongly lobbied his colleagues to
suppress their dissenting views. 3 2 6 Butler similarly regarded dis-
sents as exercises of "vanity" that "seldom aid us in the right devel-
opment or statement of the law," and instead "often do harm." 3 2 7
He therefore commonly "acquiesce[d] for the sake of harmony &
320 Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice 198 (Simon &
Schuster, New York, 1965); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court From Taft
to Warren 57 (L.S.U., Baton Rouge, 1958); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice
of the United States: Primus Inter Pares, 17 J. Pub. L. 20, 31-32 (1968).
321 Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1309.
322 Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, & Thomas Walker, The Supreme
Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments 147, 161 (C.Q., Washing-
ton, D.C., 1994).
323 Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1310.
324 Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1310-11, 1356; Mason, William Howard Taft at 198;
William Howard Taft to Harlan F. Stone, Jan. 26, 1927, Box 76, Harlan Fiske Stone
MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, quoted in Walter F. Murphy, Ele-
ments of Judicial Strategy 47 (Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, 1964).
325 2 Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft 1049 (Farrar &
Rinehart, New York, 1939) (Taft "shrank from all dissents, including his own"); Post,
85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1311-12.
326 Urofsky, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 330; Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1318, 1340, 1341,
1343.
327 Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process 214-15 (Oxford, New York, 2d. ed.
1968); Murphy at 52; Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1340.
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the Court." 328 McReynolds and Sutherland expressed similar views,
and suppressed dissenting opinions accordingly.32 9 Even the "great
dissenters," Holmes and Brandeis, believed that dissents should be
aired sparingly, and often "shut up," as Holmes liked to put it, when
their views departed from those of their colleagues.330
Like Taft, Hughes "sought to present a united Court to the pub-
lic,"3 31 frequently suppressing his own views for the sake of una-
nimity. Hughes "believed that unanimity of decision contributed to
public confidence in the Court," and "[e]xcept in cases involving
matters of high principle, he willingly acquiesced in silence rather
than expose his dissenting views." 3 3 2 As he wrote on his return of
one of Stone's draft opinions, "I choke a little at swallowing your
analysis, still I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to ex-
pose my views."333 In his efforts "to find common ground upon
which all could stand," Hughes "was willing to modify his own
328 Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1341-43.
329 Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1341-44; James C. McReynolds to Harlan F. Stone,
Apr. 2, 1930, Box 76, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Con-
gress, quoted in Corley, Steigerwalt, & Ward, 38 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. at 30; Murphy at
52-53.
3 Urofsky, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 327, 328, 330; Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1341-42,
1344-46, 1349-51; Mason, Taft to Warren at 58 ("For the sake of harmony staunch
individualists such as Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, though disagreeing, would
sometimes go along with the majority"); Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I think it useless and undesirable,
as a rule, to express dissent"); Alexander M. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of
Mr. Justice Brandeis 18 (Belknap, Cambridge, Mass., 1957) ("Can't always dissent,'
[Brandeis] said....'I sometimes endorse an opinion with which I do not agree.")
33 Epstein, Segal, & Spaeth, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. at 365. See also O'Brien, Institu-
tional Norms, at 98.
332 David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., The Autobiographical Notes of
Charles Evans Hughes xxvi (Harvard, Cambridge, Mass., 1973).
333 Charles Evans Hughes to Harlan Fiske Stone, Nov. 4, 1939, accompanying
Chief Justice Hughes, Return of Sanford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Box
65, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. On his return,
Justice Roberts wrote, "I do not agree; but as this is a mere question of construing a
tax statute, I shall say nothing unless somebody else 'hollers.' I'll let you know if I
want you to note a dissent." Justice Roberts, Return of Sanford v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, Box 65, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress. On his return, Justice McReynolds wrote, "Alas, no - Ten pages of added
confusion!" Justice McReynolds, Return of Sanford v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, Box 65, Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. In
the end, however, neither of these justices dissented. The published opinion is
unanimous.
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opinions to hold or increase his majority; and if this meant he had
to put in some disconnected thoughts or sentences, in they
went." 3 3 4 And while Hughes dissented at a higher rate as Chief Jus-
tice than had White or Taft, he did so at a much lower rate than
would Stone, Fred Vinson, or Earl Warren.3 35
A variety of factors may have contributed to what Dean Robert
Post calls this "norm of acquiescence."33 6 Here I wish to highlight
just a few. First, the literature of the period illustrates among the
bench and bar a widely-held aversion to dissents as excessively
self-regarding, and as weakening the force of judicial decisions by
unsettling the law.337 This conviction found expression in Canon 19
of the American Bar Association's Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
exhorted judges not to "yield to pride of opinion or value more
highly his individual reputation than that of the court to which he
should be loyal. Except in cases of conscientious difference of opin-
ion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be dis-
couraged in courts of last resort." Instead, "judges constituting
a court of last resort" were admonished to "use effort and self-
restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and the consequent
influence of judicial decision."338 Taft was the chair of the
334 Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice, at 174.
335 In cases decided by written opinion, White dissented in 1.35%, Taft in 0.93%,
Hughes in 2.24%, Stone in 13.49%, Vinson in 12.44%, and Warren in 12.13%. S. Sid-
ney Ulmer, Exploring the Dissent Patterns of the Chief Justices: John Marshall to
Warren Burger, in Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb, eds., Judicial Conflict and
Consensus: Behavioral Studies of American Appellate Courts 53 (Univ. of Kentucky,
Lexington, Ky., 1986).
336 Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1344.
337 Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1344, 1348-49, 1354, 1356-57; Evan A. Evans, The
Dissenting Opinion - Its Use and Abuse, 3 Mo. L. Rev. 120, 123-26 (1938) (quoting
various criticisms of dissents made by members of the bench and bar); Alex Simp-
son, Jr., Dissenting Opinions, 71 U. Pa. L. Rev. 205, 205-06 (1923) quoting various
professional criticisms of dissenting opinions); William A. Bowen, Dissenting Opin-
ions, 17 Green Bag 690, 693 (1905) ("the Dissenting Opinion is of all judicial mis-
takes the most injurious"). See also Ulmer, Exploring the Dissent Patterns, at 50-51
("dissent diminishes the image of monolithic solidarity, which allegedly enhances
respect for the Court and obedience to its mandates.")
338 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 19 (1924), in Lisa L. Milord,The Develop-
ment of the ABA Judicial Code 137 (A.B.A., Chicago, 1992). In 1972, the American
Bar Association replaced the Canons with a Code of Judicial Conduct, which does
not contain a provision similar to Canon 19. Wahlbeck, Spriggs II, & Maltzman, 27
American Politics Quarterly at 508 n.1.
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committee that drafted the Canons, and Sutherland was a commit-
tee member before his appointment to the Court.339 Second, the
norm of acquiescence promoted a collegiality and reciprocity
among the justices that smoothed over potential conflicts and
avoided alienating colleagues whose support one might need in fu-
ture cases. 34 0 Third, during this period nearly all of the justices had
only one clerk rather than the four that justices typically have
today, and most of the justices wrote their own opinions.3 41 With
such comparatively limited resources at their disposal, the cost of
preparing a dissenting opinion was considerably higher.342
The unanimity rates of the early Hughes Court were remarkably
similar to those of the White and Taft Courts. For the 1930 Term
the rate was 89.2%; for the 1931 Term it was 82.7%; for the 1932
Term it was 83.9%; and for the 1933 Term it was 83.5%. Even during
the height of the Court's encounter with the New Deal, unanimity
rates remained robust: 85.9% for the 1934 Term; 82.1% for the frac-
tious 1935 Term; and 79.2% during the 1936 Term. With the
3 Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1284 n.55.
3 Post, 85 Minn. L. Rev. at 1345. See also Caldeira & Zorn, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. at
877; Murphy at 61 ("A Justice who persistently refuses to accommodate his views
to those of his colleagues may come to be regarded as an obstructionist. A Justice
whose dissents become levers for legislative or administrative action reversing judi-
cial policies may come to be regarded as disloyal to the bench. It is possible that ei-
ther appraisal would curtail his influence with his associates.")
s4 During this period, justices were authorized to employ a law clerk and a secre-
tary. Pierce Butler used each to perform the duties of a law clerk, and one of them,
John Cotter, wrote first drafts of most of Butler's opinions. The other justices, how-
ever, tended to employ only one law clerk, and to do their own drafting. See Barry
Cushman, The Clerks of the Four Horsemen, Part 1, 39 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 386 (2014);
Barry Cushman, The Clerks of the Four Horsemen, Part II, 40 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 55
(2015); Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life 465 (Pantheon, New York, 2009).
Congress did not authorize the justices to hire two law clerks until 1941, though
most of them continued to employ only one clerk until 1946. See Artemus Ward &
David L. Weiden, Sorcerer's Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United
States Supreme Court 36-37 (N.Y.U., New York, 2006).
342 See Bradley J. Best, Law Clerks, Support Personnel, and the Decline of Consen-
sual Norms of the United States Supreme Court, 1935-1995 at 214, 232 (L.F.B., New
York, 2002) (finding "a positive, statistically significant relationship between the
number of law clerks on the Court and the frequency of dissenting and concurring
opinions"); Ley, Searles, & Clayton, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. at 112-13, 121 (concluding that
"the opportunity for cost-lowering effects of law clerks" is "significant to our under-
standing of the persistence of non-consensual norms").
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addition of the Roosevelt appointees beginning in the 1937 Term,
however, unanimity rates began a decline from which they would
never recover: 69.7% for the 1937 Term; 64% for the 1938 Term;
69.3% for the 1939 Term; and 71.5% for Hughes's last Term as Chief
Justice. And after Hughes departed the bench, it would be the ex-
ceedingly rare Term that would produce a unanimity rate exceeding
50%.343 The late Terms of the Hughes Court thus marked the death
throes of a longstanding set of institutional norms and practices,
and the inauguration of an era of "division and discord."34 4
One might be tempted to think that the dearth of instances of
acquiescence by the Roosevelt appointees is attributable to the
fact that they so often found themselves in the conference major-
ity. After Black replaced Van Devanter in August of 1937 and Reed
succeeded Sutherland in late January of 1938, the "liberal" wing of
the Court, earlier comprised by Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Car-
dozo, held a voting majority. As one observer put it in early Febru-
ary of 1938, "'the President now controls the Supreme Court.'" 3 4 5
The subsequent additions of Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy
served to solidify and augment that working majority. And it is true
that, with the exceptions of Reed in Chambers and Perkins v. Elg,
and the possible exception of Frankfurter in Falcone, the participat-
ing Roosevelt appointees were in the conference majorities of
every major unanimous decision rendered by the late Hughes
Court. In none of the remaining thirty-one unanimous cases was it
necessary for a Roosevelt appointee to acquiesce in order to make
a unanimous Court.
But when one examines the major cases in which unanimity was
not achieved, a different picture emerges. Of the thirty-nine such
343 Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, & Thomas Walker, The Supreme
Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments 247-49 (SAGE/CQ, Thou-
sand Oaks, Cal., 5 th ed. 2012).
344 Melvin I. Urofsky, Division and Discord: The Supreme Court Under Stone and
Vinson, 1941-1953 (Univ. of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C., 1997).
345 William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin 0. Roosevelt's Supreme Court "Packing"
Plan, in Essays on the New Deal 74, 109 (Harold F. Hollingsworth & William F.
Holmes, eds., Univ. of Texas, Austin, Tex., 1969) (quoting Letter from Frank Gannett
to E.A. Dodd (Feb. 5, 1938)). Due to the fact that Cardozo did not participate in any
decisions after he became ill in December of 1937, this majority was not consoli-
dated until his replacement by Frankfurter in late January of 1939.
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cases in which Black participated,3 4 6 he joined the opinion of the
Court in only twenty-seven (69.2%). With the exception of Gobitis, in
which he weakly acquiesced, Black was in the conference majority in
each of these cases.34 7 As for the remaining cases, Black dissented
whole or in part six, 3 48 noted or wrote separate concurrences in
four,3 49 and concurred in part and dissented in part in one. 350 Reed
recused himself from a number of cases with which he had been in-
volved as Solicitor General, but he nevertheless participated in
twenty-seven non-unanimous major cases. 3 -5 Of these he joined the
opinion of the Court in twenty-two (81.5%). In each of these cases
he was in the conference majority.3 5 2 Of the remaining cases he dis-
sented in three,3 53 concurred in one,35s and dissented in part and
concurred in part in one.3 55 Frankfurter participated in seventeen
such cases, and joined the majority opinion in fifteen (88.2%). In
each of these cases he was with the conference majority.35 6 In the
remaining two cases, Frankfurter noted his concurrence.357 Douglas
346 I exclude from this count Johnson v. Zerbst, which involved post-conference
vote fluidity on the part of so many justices that it is difficult to analyze in terms of
acquiescence and defection.
347 Polka; Nardone; Santa Cruz Fruit; New Negro Alliance; Lauf; Currin; Electric
Bond & Shore; Bekins; Tennessee Electric; Erie; Mountain Producers; Gaines; Mul-
ford; Eisenberg; Graves v. O'Keefe; Fainblatt; Schneider Hood; Sunshine Anthracite
Coal; Madden; Hague; O'Malley; Lane v. Wilson; Apex Hosiery; Rowan & Nichols;
Thornhill.
348 Connecticut General; Morgan II; Fansteel; Sands; Columbian Enameling;
Classic.
3 Carolene Products; Helvering v. Gerhardt; Rock Royal; Coleman.
3so Consolidated Edison.
sI exclude again from this number Johnson v. Zerbst, for the reasons stated in
n. 346, supro. It is worth noting, however, that Reed did not ultimately join the
opinion of the court in Zerbst, but instead noted a concurrence.
352 New Negro Alliance; Currin; Bekins; Gaines; Mulford; Eisenberg; Graves v.
O'Keefe; Fainblatt; Schneider; Hood; Sunshine Anthracite Coal; Rock Royal; Madden;
Hague; O'Malley; Coleman v. Miller; Lane v. Wilson; Apex Hosiery; Rowan & Nichols;
Thornhill; Gobitis; Classic.
3s3 Fonsteel; Sands; Columbian Enameling.
3 Erie.
3ss Consolidated Edison.
356 Mulford; Eisenberg; Fainblatt; Schneider; Hood; Sunshine Anthracite Coal;
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participated in twelve such cases, and joined the Court majority in
nine of them (75%). In each of these cases he was in the conference
majority.35 8 He noted his concurrence in two others,359 and dis-
sented in one.3 60 Murphy participated in five such cases, and joined
the opinion of the Court in four of them (80%). In each of these
cases he was in the conference majority.3 6 1 He dissented in the re-
maining case.362
Thus, with the lone exception of Black's weak acquiescence in
Gobitis, of these thirty-nine non-unanimous major decisions in
which one or more of the Roosevelt appointees participated, not a
single one of the new justices changed his vote to join the majority
between the conference vote and the final vote on the merits.
Where they had cast dissenting votes in conference, they ex-
pressed their dissents in the U.S. Reports. And sometimes where
they had voted with the majority on the judgment in conference,
they would nevertheless note or publish a concurrence. As Profes-
sor David O'Brien has stated, unlike their liberal predecessors
Holmes and Brandeis, Justices Black and Douglas, among others,
"noted every dissent."3 63
The docket books of the justices of the late Hughes Court thus
help us to understand the reasons for the explosion of dissensus on
the Stone Court. Some scholars have attributed the decline of una-
nimity during Stone's tenure principally to the Chief Justice's tem-
perament and leadership style. Stone disdained false appearances
of consensus, preferring instead the full airing of opinions both in
conference and in the published reports. 364 Others have agreed
358 Schneider Hood; Sunshine Anthracite Coal; Madden; O'Malley; Apex Hosiery;
Rowan & Nichols; Thornhill; Gobitis.
3 Rock Royal; Coleman.
36 Classic.
361Apex Hosiery; Rowan & Nichols; Thornhill; Gobitis.
362 Classic.
363 O'Brien, Institutional Norms, at 93. This is, of course, a bit of an exaggeration.
See, e.g., Justice Black, Return of Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342 (1941)
("I acquiesce"), and Justice Black, Return of Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335
(1941) ("I acquiesced"), Box 261, Hugo L. Black MSS, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress. The author of the circulated opinion in each case was Justice Reed.
3 See, e.g., Walker, Epstein, & Dixon, 50 J. Politics at 379-84; Danelski, The Influ-
ence of the Chief Justice, at 171-72, 175; Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 575, 591,
608.
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that these were significant factors, 3 65 but have pointed to addi-
tional factors that may have helped to contribute to the decline.
Among these are long-term changes in attitudes toward separate
opinions;3 66 a proportional reduction in the size of the Court's non-
discretionary docket and changes in the types of cases composing
that docket;3 67 and the influence of legal realism in emphasizing
the indeterminacy of legal materials, exposing the grounding of
legal principles in contestable social and political values, and in re-
vealing fault lines in legal liberalism.3 68
Still other scholars, however, have observed that a change "in
the propensity to dissent" appeared during the 1938 Term, "indi-
cating that the Court's norm of consensus was first challenged by
growing levels of dissent in the later years of the Hughes Court."3 6 9
This has inclined some to attribute the change in rates of dissent to
the appointment of several new justices "who had not been social-
ized in the traditions of consensus,"370 to the fact that some of
these justices who had formerly been law professors, who "are
more likely to write separate opinions than Justices who began
their careers in other professions,"37 ' and to the strained interper-
sonal relationships among the justices.372 As Robert Steamer put it,
the increase in dissensus was "a reflection of the fierce intellectual
365 Goldman at 337-39; Kelsh, 77 Wash. U. L. Q. at 178-79; Hendershot, Hurwitz,
Lanier, & Pacelle, Jr., 20 Political Research Quarterly at 9, 12; Robert J. Steamer,
Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court 266 (Univ. of South Carolina,
Columbia, S.C., 1986); Ley, Searles, & Clayton, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. at 106; Pritchett at
40; O'Brien, Institutional Norms, at 99, 103; Corley, Steigerwalt, & Ward, 38 J. Sup.
Ct. Hist. at 21, 27, 29-31, 32-35,47.
3 Kelsh, 77 Wash. U. L. Q. at 175-80.
367 Goldman at 337; Hendershot, Hurwitz, Lanier, & Pacelle, Jr., 20 Political
Research Quarterly at 9, 13; Corley, Steigerwalt, & Ward, 38 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. at 21-
22, 27-28, 47. Cf Walker, Epstein, & Dixon, 50 J. Politics at 364-70.
36 Ley, Searles, & Clayton, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. at 106; O'Brien, Institutional Norms, at
101, 103; Corley, Steigerwalt, & Ward, 38 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. at 21, 27-28, 47.
369 Hendershot, Hurwitz, Lanier, & Pacelle, Jr., 20 Political Research Quarterly at 8.
370 Ley, Searles, & Clayton, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. at 105; Goldman at 339. See also Cor-
ley, Steigerwalt, & Ward, 38 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. at 22, 23-24; Walker, Epstein, & Dixon,
50 J. Politics at 378, 385.
371 Ley, Searles, & Clayton, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. at 122. See also Corley, Steigerwalt, &
Ward, 38 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. at 22, 39-40; Walker, Epstein, & Dixon, 50 J. Politics at 385.
372 Goldman at 337; See also Corley, Steigerwalt, & Ward, 38 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. at
31-32; Walker, Epstein, & Dixon, 50 J. Politics at 374.
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independence" of the members of the Stone Court, most of whom
were also members of the late Hughes Court. "A spirit of compro-
mise was only minimally present as each justice insisted on main-
taining his own position."373Thus, Professor O'Brien has noted that
the decline in the Court's unanimity rate "began during the last
four years of the Hughes Court, coinciding with the arrival of FDR's
first five appointees (Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Mur-
phy). During the 1933 to 1936 terms, when the Court's composition
remained stable, the traditional norm of consensus prevailed. That
norm, however, began to fail to hold in the last four years of Hugh-
es's chief justiceship ... ."374 Professor O'Brien therefore concludes
that "too much weight has been given to [Stone's] influence and
too little to the impact of changes brought by FDR's other eight
appointees."37 5
To see how the docket books help to illustrate this point, con-
sider the following statistics. Of the seventy-two major cases that
the late Hughes Court decided by full opinion, the final vote on the
merits was unanimous in thirty (41.7%). Had one or more of the
Roosevelt appointees not acquiesced in the judgment of their col-
leagues, that number would have decreased only to twenty-seven
(37.5%) or twenty-eight (38.9%), depending upon which account of
Frankfurter's conduct in Falcone one credits. By contrast, had not
one or more of the justices of the Old Court acquiesced, that num-
ber would have decreased to twelve (16.7%).
A proper appreciation of the role of the Roosevelt appointees in
increasing dissensus, therefore, simultaneously recognizes the cor-
responding contribution made by the late Hughes Court's senior
members in retarding its public manifestation. Chief Justice
Hughes, Justice McReynolds, and Justice Butler were together the
justices responsible for the vast majority of instances of acquies-
cence on the late Hughes Court. When they left the bench, much of
the long tradition of acquiescence left with them. With their depar-
tures, the Court was left with a number of members who would
not yield to their colleagues. When they disagreed with another in
conference, that division would appear in the published reports.
7 Steamer at 266.
374 O'Brien, Institutional Norms, at 100-01.
37 O'Brien, Institutional Norms, at 103.
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A Court comprised by justices who shared greater ideological prox-
imity could thus display higher rates of dissensus than had its more
ideologically diverse predecessor.37 6 The seeds of public discord
were sown by the appointment to the Court of justices who dis-
dained the more compliant norms of their judicial forebears. Their
full flowering was held at bay only by the continued observance of
those norms by the last remnants of the Old Court.
376 The unanimity rates for the Stone Court were 60.9% for the 1941 Term, 49%
for the 1942 Term, 38.5% for the 1943 Term, 39.7% for the 1944 Term, and 42.5%
for the 1945 Term. Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, & Thomas Walker,
The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments 225 (C.Q.,
Washington, D.C., 4th ed. 2006).
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